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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the weeks following a May 2018 shooting that took ten lives at a 
high school in Santa Fe, a writer for the New Yorker revisited the Texas 
community to see how those affected by the tragedy were coping.1  One 
unnamed police officer confided that he’d suffered sleepless nights and 
been pushed to the edge of “just how much my mind can take”—but 
readers learned nothing more about him, because, he explained, he was not 
authorized to talk to the media.2 
Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker’s administration has made 
state employees so inaccessible for interviews that one journalist 
complained he was unable even to speak with a state ornithologist for a 
routine story about the declining population of barn swallows.3  In New 
York, the director of the New York State Museum retired in frustration 
over the rigid control of information under Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 
administration, telling a reporter that his staff couldn’t even respond to 
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 1. Carolyn Kormann, Back to School after the Shooting in Santa Fe, NEW YORKER (June 2, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/back-to-school-in-santa-fe [https://perma.cc/R9AB-5KKV]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. David Abel, On Subjects from Birds to Pollution, State Scientists Are Barred from Speaking to the 
Globe, BOS. GLOBE (May 13, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/05/13/from-
birds-pollution-state-scientists-are-barred-from-speaking-globe/SN3YSh3FdpOfkG8iD1K1YI/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/UX2J-UDUC] [hereinafter Abel, On Subjects from Birds to Pollution]; David Abel, A Flap 
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media questions about ladybugs.4 
“I’m not allowed to talk to the media” is one of the most frustrating 
responses a journalist can encounter in seeking information from a 
government agency.  Scientists, police officers, teachers, and legislative 
aides have unique subject-matter expertise, and when they are restrained 
from sharing their knowledge, the public’s understanding of how 
government operates suffers.  As Boston Globe columnist David Abel 
bemoaned in reporting on the obstacles that journalists encounter in trying 
to interview state employees in Massachusetts: 
For years now, as the environment reporter at the Globe, I have 
repeatedly requested to speak to a range of state scientists and other 
officials, hoping they might shed light on the often-complex subjects I 
write about and answer questions about the state’s positions.  The 
response I nearly always receive from the administration—as do many 
of my colleagues—is a self-serving statement with background bullet 
points.  Rarely do the answers address my questions.5 
It is accepted almost as a self-evident article of faith that federal, state, 
and local agencies can prohibit unapproved interactions between 
employees and the news media.  But that assumption rests on an aggressive 
interpretation of the scope of employer authority in the public sector, one 
that is irreconcilable with First Amendment doctrine, as well as with sound 
governance principles in a participatory democracy.  To the contrary, 
policies like those in force in Massachusetts, which require state workers 
to seek permission from an agency public-relations office before saying 
anything to a news organization, are almost certainly unlawful. 
As Donald Trump assumed the White House during an unusually 
rancorous transition, concern for the ability of government employees to 
freely discuss the matters within their expertise gained heightened 
urgency.  News reports that federal scientific agencies had been put on 
mute—employees banned from giving interviews and from posting to 
official social-media accounts—provoked alarm that the power of the 
presidency would be used to silence discussion of global climate change 
and other issues of public importance.6 
                                                          
 4. Jon Alexander, State Clamps Down on Release of Information, POST-STAR (Feb. 20, 2013), 
https://poststar.com/news/local/state-clamps-down-on-release-of-information/article_06338fb2-
7bb6-11e2-9e62-0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/7XJL-2NMP]. 
 5. Abel, On Subjects from Birds to Pollution, supra note 3. 
 6. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Federal Agencies Told to Halt External Communications, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/some-agencies-told-to-halt-
communications-as-trump-administration-moves-in.html [https://perma.cc/LTB9-MA67] (reporting 
that scientists with the EPA, Interior Department, Department of Agriculture and Department of 
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For decades, public employees subjected to blanket gag orders 
successfully challenged the breadth of those prohibitions and, more often 
than not, overturned disciplinary actions imposed for “unapproved 
interviewing.”7  Then came the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti 
v. Ceballos.8  Garcetti cast a shadow of uncertainty over the preceding line 
of cases protecting public employees against discipline for speaking to 
journalists.  Since Garcetti, frontal challenges to workplace gag orders 
have been rare.  Given how deferentially lower courts have applied 
Garcetti to ratify employer discipline for work-related employee speech,9 
there is understandable skepticism about whether federal courts’ 
traditional disapproval of broad gag orders is still relevant at all. 
Properly understood, Garcetti cannot be read to validate a categorical 
prohibition on public employees’ interactions with journalists.  The 
Supreme Court has said, emphatically, that the core purpose of the First 
Amendment is to assure “freedom of communication on matters relating 
to the functioning of government.”10  At most, public employers may 
enforce tailored prohibitions against, for example, compromising 
confidential information obtained in the course of employment, or 
purporting without authority to speak as an official representative of the 
agency.  An unqualified ban on granting interviews, especially when 
backed up by the threat of adverse personnel action, remains 
presumptively unconstitutional as a prior restraint on speech, even after 
Garcetti.11 
The Supreme Court’s 2014 ruling in Lane v. Franks clarified that the 
Garcetti principle applies to a narrow category of work-assignment 
speech, vindicating the rights of an Alabama whistleblower fired for 
testifying unfavorably about his employer before a grand jury.12  Since 
Lane, the one circuit court to address the constitutionality of a gag policy 
broadly restricting government employees’ ability to discuss work-related 
                                                          
Health and Human Services all received memos instructing them not to communicate with the public 
without supervisory approval, including through interviews or agency social media accounts). 
 7. See infra Section III.B.   
 8. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 9. See David L. Hudson Jr., The Garcetti Effect, ABA J.: NAT’L PULSE (Jan. 1, 2008, 8:14 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_garcetti_effect [https://perma.cc/L6LW-D8Q7] (noting 
that lower courts applying Garcetti “have increasingly ruled against public employee plaintiffs who 
previously might have won”). 
 10. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). 
 11. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995) (characterizing 
restriction on certain federal employees giving public speeches in exchange for honoraria as a prior 
restraint contravening the employees’ First Amendment rights). 
 12. 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014) (noting that Garcetti asks “whether the speech at issue is itself 
ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties”). 
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matters with the public has, properly, struck down the policy as 
indefensibly broad.13 
Journalists denied access to their desired government sources should 
be able to establish standing to challenge unconstitutional gag orders based 
on their history of success in the analogous context of challenging gag 
orders on trial participants.14  But there is no record of their doing so.  
Rather, the burden has invariably fallen to government employees 
penalized for unapproved contact with the news media.  As a result, 
overbroad restraints on employee speech are the Schrödinger’s cat of First 
Amendment law.  They are unenforceable constitutionally, yet still 
proliferate and still exert a powerful influence on the way employees 
behave—until an employee suffers a serious enough deprivation to 
motivate a lawsuit. 
This Article attempts to provide a roadmap by which news 
organizations aggrieved by excessively heavy-handed control over public 
employees’ speech can bring their own challenges.  It also identifies the 
likely legal and practical obstacles in litigating First Amendment cases 
asserting public employees’ right to speak freely to the press.  Part II lays 
out the foundational legal principles that constrain the government’s 
authority to prevent or punish speech, and how those constraints are 
understood to vary in the government workplace.  Part III describes how, 
in a case brought by federal employees denied the ability to earn honoraria 
for off-hours speaking engagements, the Supreme Court crafted an 
enduring standard that confines the government’s ability to preemptively 
restrain speech.  Part IV explains the Supreme Court’s oft-misapplied 
Garcetti standard, and how widespread misinterpretation of that 2006 
decision may have emboldened government employers to enact 
overreaching speech policies.  Part V identifies an additional constitutional 
infirmity in government agencies’ regulation of speech: the failure to enact 
clear, objective standards constraining the discretion of decision makers in 
determining who gets to speak.  Part VI presents the results of research 
gathering and analyzing policies to show how routinely agencies at all 
levels—from Cabinet agencies down to local schools—constrain 
employee speech in derogation of established First Amendment precedent.  
Part VII explores why legal challenges to workplace gag orders are rare, 
and why news organizations can and must assume primary responsibility 
for bringing the First Amendment cases that employees themselves will 
not.  Finally, Part VIII concludes with a policy-based rationale for 
unshackling government speakers at a time when struggling news 
                                                          
 13. Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853, 875 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 14. See infra Section VII.B. 
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organizations, and their audiences, need first-hand access to trustworthy 
information more than ever. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT WORKPLACE 
A. The Tenuous Balance: Authority Versus Individual Liberty 
Outside the employment setting, it is firmly established that 
government-enforced prohibitions or penalties based on the content of 
speech are presumptively unconstitutional.15  Categorical prohibitions or 
penalties are vulnerable to constitutional challenge if they are 
“substantially overbroad,” meaning that they are insufficiently tailored to 
address the government’s proffered interest and, consequently, restrict 
more speech than is necessary to achieve that interest.16 
“Prior restraints” that categorically forbid speech before it can be 
heard are especially disfavored, and unlikely to be found lawful absent the 
most compelling of justifications.17  The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that a government policy forbidding the dissemination of 
particular speech is a prior restraint.18  A prior restraint on speech bears a 
“heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”19  Indeed, a prior 
restraint is regarded as “the most serious and the least tolerable 
infringement on First Amendment rights.”20  Prior restraints are uniquely 
disfavored because they prevent information from being heard or 
published at all, and are therefore the most direct attack on the marketplace 
of ideas.21 
A century’s worth of caselaw establishes that uncensored discussion 
of governmental affairs is the core of expressive activity the First 
Amendment is intended to protect.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
                                                          
 15. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). 
 16. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798–800 
(1984) (explaining that the overbreadth doctrine relaxes traditional standing principles to permit facial 
challenges to speech-restrictive measures, to prevent “an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of 
third parties who are not before the Court”). 
 17. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints 
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”).  
Accord Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).  
 18. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (finding that the statute 
in question operated as a prior restraint that infringed on the freedom of the press).   
 19. See Sullivan, 372 U.S. at 70.  Accord N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714; Keefe, 
402 U.S. at 419. 
 20. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 21. See id. at 559–60; see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 315–16 (1980) 
(“[T]he burden of supporting an injunction against a future exhibition is even heavier than the burden 
of justifying the imposition of a criminal sanction for a past communication.”).  
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vacating the criminal conviction of a public official charged with defaming 
local judges: “Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal 
sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned . . . .  For speech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of 
self-government.”22 
The Supreme Court has relaxed the constraints on government 
authority when the speaker is a public employee.  Still, the First 
Amendment protects public-sector workers, albeit with compromises in 
the name of workplace harmony and the government’s interest in 
effectively conveying official agency messages.23 
Public employees retain the right to comment as citizens on matters of 
public concern.24  These interests go to the core of the freedoms the First 
Amendment was designed to protect.25  While the government has special 
authority to regulate the speech of its employees, “[v]igilance is necessary 
to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to 
silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply 
because superiors disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”26 
A restraint on government employee expression “also imposes a 
significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear what the 
employees would otherwise have written and said.”27  The Supreme Court 
has noted that “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to 
know what ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain 
much from their informed opinions.”28 
In a fragment of dicta with outsized reverberations, then-
Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote in 
an 1892 retaliatory-discharge case, McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford: 
                                                          
 22. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 65–67, 74–75 (1964).   
 23. See Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]o justify a restriction 
on speech of public concern by a public employee, plaintiff’s speech must . . . undermine a legitimate 
goal or mission of the employer . . . or impair harmony among co-workers.”).  
 24. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (noting that public employers cannot 
compel public employees “to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as 
citizens to comment on matters of public interest”). 
 25. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating that the First Amendment 
“was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people”); see also Austin Leland Fleishour, Note, Protecting Harmful Speech 
on Matters of Public Concern, 79 TENN. L. REV. 213, 217 (2011) (“[T]he Court has furthered the 
mission of protecting speech on public matters by holding on numerous occasions that expression on 
public issues has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 26. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). 
 27. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995). 
 28. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572). 
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“[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has 
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”29  For decades, courts declined 
to entertain retaliation claims by government employees penalized for job-
related speech.  Relying on the Holmes dictum, a New York court in 1950 
dismissed a First Amendment challenge to a statute disqualifying 
members of anti-government organizations from public employment: “A 
constitutional right of free speech may be abridged as a condition to the 
enjoyment of public employment.  One does not have a constitutional right 
to be a public employee except upon compliance with reasonable 
conditions imposed upon all, or imposed under reasonable 
classifications.”30 
The Supreme Court expressly disavowed the Holmes aphorism in a 
public employee due process case, Garrity v. New Jersey, in which Justice 
William O. Douglas wrote: “We conclude that policemen, like teachers 
and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional 
rights.”31  The Supreme Court extended Garrity’s reasoning to employee 
First Amendment claims in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, in which the 
Court invalidated a New York statute compelling public employees to sign 
oaths forswearing allegiance to the Communist Party under threat of 
discharge.32 
The constitutionality of government constraints on employee speech 
is analyzed in two different ways, depending on whether the constraint is 
a blanket prohibition on speech (a “prior restraint”) or an after-the-fact 
punishment imposed for particular speech.33  The more commonly 
litigated scenario is the latter, and consequently, the body of law 
addressing content-based discipline for speech disagreeable to the 
employer is the better-known and better-developed. 
B. Pickering, Connick, Garcetti, and Content-Based Discipline for 
Speech 
Just months after its landmark ruling in Keyishian, the Court decided 
Pickering v. Board of Education and put in place an enduring framework 
for evaluating the First Amendment claims of public employees punished 
                                                          
 29. 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 30. Lederman v. N.Y. Bd. of Educ., 276 A.D. 527, 528–29, 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (citations 
omitted); see also Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964, 964–67 (D.D.C. 1949) (dismissing First 
Amendment challenge to mandatory loyalty oath imposed as precondition of federal employment).  
 31. 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). 
 32. 385 U.S. 589, 592, 609–10 (1967). 
 33. See infra Section III.A.  
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for the content of their speech.34 
In Pickering, a public school teacher wrote a letter to a local 
newspaper critical of his employer’s management of money.35  In his 
letter, he addressed the school board’s handling of bond issues and the 
board’s “allocation of financial resources between the schools’ 
educational and athletic programs.”36  Pickering signed the letter with his 
own name.37  The school board terminated Pickering for the letter.38 
Pickering challenged his dismissal as a violation of the First 
Amendment but found no sympathy in the Illinois courts.  The state 
Supreme Court focused on perceived inaccuracies in Pickering’s letter and 
on the voluntary surrender of freedoms that comes with accepting 
employment.39  The court held: 
[A schoolteacher] is no more entitled to harm the schools by speech than 
by incompetency, cruelty, negligence, immorality, or any other conduct 
for which there may be no legal sanction.  By choosing to teach in the 
public schools, plaintiff undertook the obligation to refrain from conduct 
which in the absence of such position he would have an undoubted right 
to engage in.40 
The Supreme Court accepted the case and reversed.  In an 8–1 opinion 
by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the justices determined that under the First 
Amendment, a public employee cannot be terminated for exercising the 
right to comment on matters of public importance absent proof that the 
employee knowingly or recklessly made false statements.41 
The Court acknowledged a government employer’s interest in 
avoiding workplace disruption, but found no evidence of any such 
disruption resulting from Pickering’s letter, which—in Justice Marshall’s 
words—“was greeted by everyone but its main target, the Board, with 
massive apathy and total disbelief.”42  That the Board might find the letter 
harmful to members’ reputations, Justice Marshall wrote, was not the sort 
of disruption that could justify restraining or penalizing employee 
speech.43  The Court noted: 
                                                          
 34. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 35. Id. at 564.  
 36. Id. at 566. 
 37. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 38. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
 39. Pickering, 225 N.E.2d at 5–6. 
 40. Id. at 6.  
 41. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
 42. Id. at 570. 
 43. Id. at 571. 
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The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees.44 
Because the lower courts failed to adequately consider the speaker’s 
interest in being heard on a matter of public concern, the justices sent the 
case back for application of a more speech-protective balance.45 
The justices added a clarifying, and arguably narrowing, gloss to 
Pickering in their 1983 ruling in Connick v. Myers.46  In Connick, an 
assistant district attorney, Sheila Myers, circulated a questionnaire among 
her coworkers about “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a 
grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether 
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”47  The Court 
concluded that, with the exception of the question about coercion to 
volunteer for campaigns, the survey was primarily a series of personal 
grievances rather than an attempt to inform the public about workplace 
problems.48  The Court’s 5–4 majority found it significant that Myers 
spoke internally within the workplace rather than attempting to convey 
information to an external audience, which made the survey look like an 
attempt to “gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her 
superiors.”49 
Because one element of Myers’s speech touched on a matter of public 
concern, the justices proceeded to the second prong of the Pickering 
analysis, examining whether the survey question jeopardized workplace 
harmony sufficiently to override Myers’s right to speak.50  Examining the 
context and form of the speech, the majority found minimal expressive 
value and significant risk of workplace disruption: the speech was 
disseminated at work and not to the larger public, it occurred as a direct 
outgrowth of Myers’s personal dispute with her supervisors over working 
conditions, and it was likely to prolong and aggravate that dispute.51  Thus, 
it was unprotected.52 
Justice Byron White’s majority opinion repeatedly emphasized the 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 568. 
 45. Id. at 574–75.  
 46. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 47. Id. at 141.  
 48. Id. at 148–49. 
 49. Id. at 148. 
 50. Id. at 150–52. 
 51. Id. at 153–54. 
 52. Id. at 154.  
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narrow fact-specificity of the case, cautioning that the ruling should not be 
read as a “defeat for the First Amendment.”53  Nevertheless, in the ensuing 
years, lower courts found in Connick a way to dispose of troublesome 
cases in which employees ran afoul of their supervisors for speech critical 
of agency practices or personnel. 
  For instance, the Fifth Circuit found no First Amendment violation 
when a Texas college fired a campus police officer over the contents of a 
personal notepad containing remarks critical of the police chief’s 
management abilities.54  The officer, a captain with the University of 
Houston police department, kept a running log of his perceived 
shortcomings in department leadership—including inadequately trained 
supervisors and a lack of exit interviews for departing employees.55  A 
copy of the notes were, without his consent, leaked to the chief.56  The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s holding that no First Amendment 
violation occurred, finding that the fired officer “spoke only as an 
employee and not as a citizen.”57  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit applied 
Connick to dismiss the First Amendment case of an Arkansas police 
officer who alleged he was demoted and assigned menial tasks in 
retaliation for refusing to falsify facts in a statement he was assigned to 
write concerning the firing of two co-workers.58  The court reasoned that, 
because the officer was speaking in his official capacity in an in-house 
memo, his speech did not qualify for Pickering protection as the speech of 
a citizen addressing a matter of public concern.59  As one critic stated, 
reflecting on the first four years of judicial attempts at reconciling Connick 
with Pickering: 
[L]ower federal courts have been anything but consistent in their 
determination of what speech is protected under Connick v. Myers.  
Although broad categories of cases can be identified, there exist 
contradictions within every category, leaving public employees and 
employers confused as to the scope of their free speech rights and 
responsibilities.60 
                                                          
 53. Id.  
 54. Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1361–62 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 55. Id. at 1361. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546, 547–49 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 59. Id. at 548–49. 
 60. Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of 
Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75 (1988); see also Tony Coppola, Note, Content, Form, and 
Context—The Eighth Circuit Misapplies the Connick Test in Examining the First Amendment Rights 
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C. Constraints on Employee Speech: The Historical Perspective 
It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court, in Gitlow v. New York, 
explicitly applied the First Amendment to acts of state and local 
government constraining speech, by way of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.61  Two decades later, in one of the earliest known 
challenges to a workplace gag policy, the New York Court of Appeals 
invalidated a directive by the City of New York Fire Commissioner 
ordering members of the firefighters’ union to stop making disparaging 
remarks to the news media about their working conditions, under threat of 
discipline.62  The commissioner invoked a department rule providing that 
employees needed written approval from the chief before their names or 
images could appear in a newspaper or magazine.63  Although the court 
applied a mere rational-basis level of scrutiny to the regulation and 
rejected firefighters’ facial constitutional challenge, the court found that 
the way the commissioner applied the regulation was “so broad in scope 
and so rigid in terms as to be arbitrary and unreasonable.”64  The ruling 
turned primarily on a state civil rights law guaranteeing all citizens the 
right to seek redress of employment grievances, which the court 
interpreted as prohibiting the commissioner from retaliating against 
firefighters for complaining to the media about the way their grievances 
were handled.65 
When Pickering came along in 1968, it did nothing to upset the 
presumption that government agencies cannot categorically prevent 
employees from speaking out on matters of public concern.  Applying the 
Pickering balancing test, lower courts routinely struck down overly broad 
policies that unduly interfered with public employees’ communications 
with journalists and the public. 
For example, a federal district court decided in 1981 that the Chicago 
Fire Department’s policy prohibiting unapproved interviews with the 
media (“whether on or off duty”) about matters “pertaining to [Fire] 
Department activities” was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.66  A 
                                                          
of a Public Employee in Buazard v. Meridith, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 417, 463 (2000) (asserting that, 
as a result of the Eighth Circuit’s expansive application of Connick, “the risk exists that public 
employees will be unable to turn to the judicial system for protection when faced with a decision to 
either participate in improper activity or decline to at the risk of losing their jobs”). 
 61. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 62. Kane v. Walsh, 66 N.E.2d 53, 56–57 (N.Y. 1946). 
 63. Id. at 55. 
 64. Id. at 56. 
 65. Id. at 56–57. 
 66. Grady v. Blair, 529 F. Supp. 370, 371–72 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
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state-court judge in New York, applying Pickering, found that a municipal 
policy that forbade firefighters from discussing “for publication, matters 
concerning the department” without supervisory approval was invalid 
because it could “stifl[e] what may be just criticism by a public servant 
concerning a matter of public concern.”67  By contrast, an Illinois sheriff’s 
narrower policy, which forbade officers from speaking without approval 
only “when acting as departmental representatives,” survived a facial 
overbreadth challenge under the Seventh Circuit’s application of 
Pickering.68 
One discordant note for employee rights came in the Fifth Circuit’s 
split decision in Moore v. City of Kilgore.69  There, the court ruled 3–0 in 
favor of a demoted firefighter in his “as-applied” challenge to punitive 
action taken in response to statements in a television interview about the 
fire department’s depleted manpower after recent layoffs.70  A two-judge 
majority found that firefighter Gary Moore lacked standing for his facial 
challenge to the fire department’s requirement of prior approval before 
speaking to the media, but, in dicta, expressed serious doubt that the rule 
could be challenged on overbreadth grounds.71  The majority focused on 
the fact that Moore was merely punished after speaking, and not prevented 
from speaking.72  But in dissent, Judge Irving L. Goldberg characterized 
the department’s policy as a “classic” unlawful prior restraint: 
[T]he Kilgore Rule directs Moore, or any other Fire Department 
employee, to seek the Chief’s approval before speaking.  There are no 
guidelines for the Chief to apply to decide what to authorize and what 
not to authorize.  In this situation, the Chief has the opportunity to act as 
a censor of the viewpoints of the fire department’s employees.  If the 
speaker must seek permission or review before speaking, then the system 
is a prior restraint.73 
                                                          
 67. Steenrod v. Bd. of Eng’rs of Fire Dep’t, 87 Misc. 2d 977, 978–79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); see 
also Hall v. Mayor of Pennsauken, 422 A.2d 797, 799–800 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (holding 
that law enforcement agency’s policy forbidding criticism of superior officers was invalid, because it 
prohibited even speech related to matters of public concern that did not adversely affect the functioning 
of the department). 
 68. Zook v. Brown, 748 F.2d 1161, 1167 (7th Cir. 1984).  The court declined to assess the facial 
validity of a second policy, restricting officers from unapproved speech in advertisements or 
testimonials, remanding that issue for further development.  Id. at 1168. 
 69. 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 70. Id. at 367–68, 376–77. 
 71. Id. at 377. 
 72. Id. at 385 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 386 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).  Judge Goldberg relied principally on the Supreme 
Court’s Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447, 453 (1938), in which the Court vacated the 
conviction of a Georgia woman penalized for violating a city ordinance requiring the city manager’s 
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Judge Goldberg’s opinion presciently anticipated how the Supreme 
Court would soon resolve the issue. 
III. THE NTEU STANDARD AND PRIOR RESTRAINTS 
A. The NTEU Decision: Unmuting Federal Employees 
The Supreme Court did not deal directly with a blanket restriction on 
government employee speech until United States v. National Treasury 
Employees Union (NTEU).74  In that 1995 ruling, the Court struck down 
an ethics statute prohibiting federal workers from accepting payment for 
speeches or articles.75 
The statute originated with a federal ethics commission’s study raising 
alarm over the risk that members of Congress could be influenced by 
speaking fees from special-interest groups with a stake in federal 
legislation.76  But the Court found that the ban was not narrowly tailored 
to advance the stated justification of curbing influence-buying, noting that 
even low-level employees with minimal policy-making authority would 
be affected: “Deferring to the Government’s speculation about the 
pernicious effects of thousands of articles and speeches yet to be written 
or delivered would encroach unacceptably on the First Amendment’s 
protections.”77 
The NTEU Court found the prohibition especially offensive to the First 
Amendment because it constituted a prior restraint against speech, as 
opposed to an after-the-fact penalty imposed on an individual speaker.78  
Because the statute chilled many thousands of speakers from even 
attempting to speak, the Government’s burden of justification was greater 
than in justifying “an isolated disciplinary action.”79  That the restriction 
was merely on receiving payment rather than on speaking at all, the 
justices concluded, was immaterial, as its purpose and effect was to inhibit 
employees from speaking about matters within their expertise.80 
                                                          
written approval for distributing handbills. Id. at 387 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 74. 513 U.S. 454, 474 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 457.  
 76. Id. at 457–58. 
 77. Id. at 475 n.21, 476–77.  
 78. Id. at 468. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 468–69 (“Although [the statute] neither prohibits any speech nor discriminates 
among speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their messages, its prohibition on compensation 
unquestionably imposes a significant burden on expressive activity. . . .  [C]ompensation provides a 
significant incentive toward more expression.  By denying respondents that incentive, the honoraria 
ban induces [employees] to curtail their expression if they wish to continue working for the 
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Referencing the Pickering standard, the Court observed that the 
speech curtailed by the statute addressed matters of public concern and 
was delivered in the plaintiff employees’ citizen capacity: “The speeches 
and articles for which they received compensation in the past were 
addressed to a public audience, were made outside the workplace, and 
involved content largely unrelated to their government employment.”81 
The government argued that the ban was needed to uphold the 
integrity of public service and to promote the efficient operation of 
government.82  The Court found this argument unpersuasive.83  Absent a 
nexus that connected the employees’ speech directly to their work 
responsibilities, there was “no corrupt bargain or even appearance of 
impropriety.”84 
Under the NTEU test, where the government singles out expressive 
activity for regulation to address anticipated harms, the government must 
“demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and 
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material 
way.”85 
B. NTEU in Action 
Following NTEU, lower courts regularly struck down gag orders 
imposed by state and local agencies that purported to require employer 
approval of all contact with the media.  Indeed, no “prior restraint” on 
public employee speech, even outside the context of media interviews, 
appears to survive constitutional challenge once the strong medicine of 
NTEU is found to apply. 
In an oft-cited case applying NTEU, Harman v. City of New York, the 
Second Circuit found that two New York City agencies overreached in 
prohibiting employees from communicating with the media about agency 
policies or activities without prior agency approval.86  The challenge 
focused on a policy disseminated by the city’s Administration of 
Children’s Services, which stated: 
All contacts with the media regarding any policies or activities of the 
Agency—whether such contacts are initiated by media representatives 
                                                          
Government.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 81. Id. at 466. 
 82. Id. at 472–74.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 474. 
 85. Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion)).  
 86. 140 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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or by an Agency employee—must be referred to the ACS Media 
Relations Office before any information is conveyed by an employee or 
before any commitments are made by an employee to convey 
information.  The ACS Media Relations Office will determine the 
appropriate manner in which to handle media contacts regarding Agency 
policies or activities, including the appropriate person or persons to make 
such contacts, consistent with the efficient and effective operation of the 
Agency and the achievement of its objectives.87 
The Second Circuit noted that the ban prohibited speech that was of 
concern to the public.88  Therefore, the city bore “the burden of 
demonstrating that the challenged policies are necessary to the efficient 
operation of the agencies.”89  The burden is particularly high where the 
blanket ban was prospective, as opposed to retrospective, or in response to 
an individual who had already spoken with the media.90  To justify this 
ban, “the Government must show that the interests of both potential 
audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad 
range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expression’s 
‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the Government.”91  The 
court observed that New York City’s ban was even broader than the 
federal ban that was struck down in NTEU, which burdened employee 
speech only indirectly by removing the speaker’s financial incentive.92 
Similarly, the Third Circuit (in an opinion written by future Justice 
Samuel Alito) applied NTEU to invalidate a Pittsburgh Police Bureau 
                                                          
 87. Id. at 116. 
 88. Id. at 117–18. 
 89. Id. at 118. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. (citing United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995)). 
 92. Id. at 119.  Multiple district courts have followed Harman in invalidating policies that broadly 
restrict public employees from discussing their work with the media.  See, e.g., Davis v. Phenix City, 
No. 3:06cv544-WHA, 2008 WL 401349, at *9–13 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2008) (finding that Alabama 
fire department’s policies against discussing work-related matters with the media and the city council 
could be viewed as prior restraints under Harman and NTEU and were facially overbroad because they 
did not make any exception for matters of public concern such as complaints about inadequate staffing 
levels); Price v. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 105CV0465LEKDRH, 2006 WL 314458, at *1, *6 
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2006) (striking down a gag order that forbade school employees from lodging 
complaints outside their chain of command, which was used to discipline a teacher who reported 
concerns about inadequate employee training and support to members of the local school board and 
also contacted police about a dangerous prank that her supervisors failed to investigate seriously).  By 
contrast, a district court in Connecticut distinguished Harman and NTEU in rejecting a facial challenge 
to a narrower set of restrictions applying only to “formal” news releases or the release of “confidential” 
information.  Shelton Police Union v. Voccola, 125 F. Supp. 2d 604, 623–25 (D. Conn. 2001).  The 
court in the Shelton Police case ultimately ruled in the employee’s favor in an as-applied challenge, 
finding that the employer failed to satisfy the Pickering standard in disciplining a police officer who 
publicly criticized the police chief for making racially offensive remarks.  Id. at 630. 
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policy restricting officers’ freedom to offer expert witness testimony.93  
The policy at issue provided that “written authorization from the Chief of 
Police must be given before any member [of the force] may testify as an 
expert witness.”94  The trial court analyzed the statute as a prior restraint 
under the NTEU standard and found it unconstitutionally overbroad, and 
the Third Circuit agreed.95  Citing Harman, the court applied the more 
demanding version of the Pickering balancing-of-interests test that applies 
to a policy of prior restraint, and found the policy insufficiently well-
tailored to accomplish the proffered objective of avoiding public 
confusion about the police department’s official position.96  The speech at 
issue, then-Judge Alito wrote, plainly touched on matters of public 
concern, and the policy did not limit itself to the disclosure of only 
confidential information—which, in any event, preexisting department 
policy already prohibited.97 
The Seventh Circuit applied NTEU to assess the constitutionality of a 
Milwaukee Police Department policy prohibiting employees from 
discussing the substance of formal grievance filings with any outsiders, 
even their own lawyers or union representatives.98  Opening with an 
immortally dismissive line—“This is one of those cases in which litigation 
seems to have replaced common sense”—Judge Ilana Rovner’s opinion 
relied on Harman in concluding that the department’s policy required a 
rigorous NTEU analysis because of its impact on all would-be speakers: 
“With a prior restraint, the impact is more widespread than any single 
supervisory decision would be, and the action chills potential speech 
instead of merely punishing actual speech already communicated.”99 
In a factually novel case extending beyond the traditional employment 
setting, the Seventh Circuit subsequently relied on NTEU in striking down 
a University of Illinois policy forbidding anyone “associated with” the 
university from communicating with a prospective athletic recruit without 
the athletic director’s authorization.100  The case was brought by students 
and faculty members who sought to enlist star athletic prospects in their 
campaign to change the university’s cartoonishly stereotypical Native 
                                                          
 93. Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 231, 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 94. Id. at 232. 
 95. Id. at 233, 241–42. 
 96. Id. at 235–36, 240. 
 97. Id. at 238–39. 
 98. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 744–45, 749–50 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 99. Id. at 744, 750 (citing United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 
(1995)). 
 100. Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 674–75, 680 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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American mascot.101  While the policy applied to students and alumni as 
well as employees, the appeals court found the NTEU framework 
applicable because of the sweeping breadth of the prohibition, and 
invalidated the rule as overbroad.102 
Over and over, post-NTEU cases brought by police officers or 
firefighters ended with the same result: A directive that employees refrain 
from discussing their work with the media, or obtain supervisory approval 
before doing so, violates the First Amendment.103  Among the policies 
struck down in the aftermath of NTEU include: 
 A fire chief’s order telling employees that “only the Chief of 
Department has the authority to discuss for publication, 
matters concerning the Department,” with violation of the 
order punishable by disciplinary sanction.104 
 A regulation forbidding officers of a state police agency from 
disclosing “any information not generally available to 
members of the public which such member receives or 
acquires in the course of and by reason of official duty” 
without supervisory approval, and requiring employees to 
treat “any matters or information” pertaining to the agency as 
confidential.105 
 A police department’s rule providing that only the police chief 
or the chief’s designee could release information to the media 
“relative to questions of enforcement policy; disciplinary 
action against a member of the department; organizational 
changes; policy statements; annual reports or crime statistics; 
                                                          
 101. Id. at 674–75. 
 102. Id. at 678–80. 
 103. Policies that restrict only critical or unfavorable speech about the employer are similarly 
infirm, whether viewed as prior restraints under the NTEU standard or as viewpoint-discriminatory 
under a more traditional First Amendment analysis.  See, e.g., Westbrook v. Teton Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 918 F. Supp. 1475, 1481, 1489, 1498 (D. Wyo. 1996) (finding school district’s policy forbidding 
criticism of co-workers or supervisors, including members of the school board, outside of limited 
settings to be unconstitutionally overbroad).  Interestingly, the court in Westbrook, though its ruling 
followed NTEU by just thirteen months, neither mentioned the Supreme Court’s ruling nor applied its 
prior-restraint analysis, yet reached the same result anyway.  Id.  
 104. Providence Firefighters Local 799 v. City of Providence, 26 F. Supp. 2d 350, 352, 357 (D.R.I. 
1998).  The order augmented an existing regulation requiring the fire chief’s pre-approval before 
making any comments for publication, which the court likewise found unconstitutionally overbroad.  
Id. at 352, 357.  
 105. Davis v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 742 A.2d 619, 622–23, 636 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1999).  The policy was challenged in the context of a race discrimination complaint by black 
officers, who were inhibited from granting requests for interviews from the news media about their 
discrimination case because of the regulation.  Id. at 622. 
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answers to criticism against the department; ‘mug’ shots.”106 
 A directive requiring “express authorization” before any 
member of a police department could speak to the news media 
and forbidding any officer from making “any public statement 
regarding a private matter of this department.”107 
 A highway patrol agency’s policy forbidding troopers from 
making “official comments relative to department policy” to 
members of the press or public without supervisory 
approval.108 
 A Massachusetts fire department regulation prohibiting 
employees from making “statements for publication 
concerning the plans, policies, or affairs of the administration 
of the fire department unless authorized to do so by the 
commissioner and chief.”109 
In an especially extreme case where firefighters were gagged by a 
municipal ordinance carrying criminal penalties of up to ninety days in 
jail, a Michigan district court applied NTEU to throw out the ordinance as 
unconstitutional.110  The court found the ordinance fatally overbroad 
because it required employees to refer all requests for comment to the fire 
chief “regarding the policies, procedures, practices and/or operation of the 
fire department.”111  Although the agency insisted that the policy was 
intended only to restrict “official” statements made on behalf of the fire 
department, the court found no such limiting application could be inferred 
from the plain wording of the ordinance, which would chill all employee 
speech.112  The court also rejected the fire department’s insistence that the 
ordinance should be viewed under the more employer-friendly standard of 
Pickering: 
Pickering, however, is only applicable where the employee has been 
punished after speaking in an ad hoc disciplinary action.  When, in 
contrast, the restriction on speech takes the form of a pre-speech threat 
of punishment that deters employees from engaging in the speech, the 
                                                          
 106. Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F. Supp. 2d 78, 89–90 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 107. Kessler v. City of Providence, 167 F. Supp. 2d 482, 483, 490 (D.R.I. 2001). 
 108. Lauretano v. Spada, 339 F. Supp. 2d 391, 414–15, 420 (D. Conn. 2004). 
 109. Parow v. Kinnon, 300 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260, 266 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 110. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Local 3233 v. Frenchtown, 246 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736, 739–44 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003). 
 111. Id. at 736, 743–44. 
 112. Id. at 738–39. 
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proper test is the more stringent one elucidated in NTEU.113 
The court went on to explain that NTEU is the more demanding 
standard because it requires the government to “show that the speech being 
restricted necessarily would have impacted the actual operation of the 
government,” which the fire department could not do in defending the 
ordinance.114 
Affirming that employers retain some authority over public 
employees’ speech, the Second Circuit rejected an NTEU-based challenge 
to a New York Police Department policy requiring only the officers to 
provide advance notice before giving a speech and a written summary of 
their remarks the following business day.115  Distinguishing the more 
onerous pre-approval policy found unlawful in Harman, the court was 
unpersuaded that merely requiring notification would be so intimidating 
as to deter a reasonable officer from speaking freely: “In the absence of 
the approval requirement, there is no opportunity for the City to suppress 
or delay speech expressing dissenting views.”116  Notably, the police 
department’s successful defense of the notification policy relied in part on 
assuring the court that the policy governed only “speeches” and not 
remarks made to the news media: “The release to the media of information 
concerning official business of the NYPD is governed by a separate 
provision . . . which encourages officers ‘to facilitate the accurate, timely 
and proper dissemination of information’ to the public.”117  Thus, the 
Second Circuit’s resolution of the Latino Officers case is a narrow one that 
says nothing about whether a prior approval policy before speaking to the 
news media would be constitutional.118 
                                                          
 113. Id. at 740. 
 114. Id. at 740–41.  
 115. Latino Officers Ass’n v. Safir, 170 F.3d 167, 168, 172–73 (2d Cir. 1999).  The “notice and 
reporting” policy was a significant concession by police authorities from the more rigid prior approval 
policy that the Latino officers initially challenged, resulting in a NTEU-based ruling enjoining 
enforcement of the broader policy.  Latino Officers Ass’n v. Safir, No. 97 Civ. 3143 (SHS), 1997 WL 
426099, at *2, *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1997).  Because the NYPD rescinded the preapproval aspect of 
the policy by virtue of a consent decree with the Latino officers, the Second Circuit considered only 
the remaining, less restrictive provisions.  Latino Officers Ass’n, 170 F.3d at 173. 
 116. Latino Officers Ass’n, 170 F.3d at 172. 
 117. Id. at 170. 
 118. See Davis v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 742 A.2d 619, 630 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1999) (distinguishing Latino Officers in the case of a policy that required prior approval as opposed 
to merely prior notice and reading the Latino Officers case to imply that a policy actually allowing 
supervisors to delay or suppress speech would be “constitutionally troublesome”).  In summarily 
dismissing an employee’s facial challenge to a mandatory prior notification policy before employees 
of a city housing department could speak to the media, a district court recognized the distinction as 
decisive: “[T]he media policy does not seek to enjoin speech or require advance approval.  Rather, it 
simply requires notification before an employee speaks to the press . . . .  Therefore, as written it is not 
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IV. GARCETTI CHANGES THE GAME (OR DOES IT?) 
A. Garcetti and Its Impact on Speech “Pursuant to” Official Duties 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,119 the Supreme Court made it more difficult 
for a public employee disciplined for the content of speech to establish a 
First Amendment claim.  There, the Court found that speech by a 
government employee, even when addressing matters of public concern, 
is not protected by the First Amendment if it is made “pursuant to” the 
employee’s official duties.120 
In Garcetti, prosecutor Richard Ceballos was punished for speech that 
departed from the position of his employer, the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s Office, on a pending criminal case.121  Specifically, 
Ceballos alleged he was demoted and suffered other retaliatory acts 
because he wrote a memo that cast doubt on the validity of evidence used 
to support a search warrant and arrest, and then testified on behalf of the 
arrestee when his case went to trial.122  Ceballos argued that both the memo 
and the testimony were constitutionally protected speech, but in a 5–4 
opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court 
disagreed.123 
The Court recognized that the fact that “Ceballos expressed his views 
inside his office, rather than publicly, is not dispositive,” as speech may 
be constitutionally protected even when directed internally up the chain of 
command.124  But the Court concluded that this particular speech was 
unprotected as “speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities.”125  The Court thus carved out a categorically 
unprotected subset of employee speech: “We hold that when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees 
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”126 
The majority reasoned that a government employer’s interest is at its 
                                                          
a prior restraint.” Milde v. Hous. Auth. of Greenwich, No. 3:00CV2423, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43470, at *57 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2005). 
 119. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
 120. Id. at 421. 
 121. Id. at 413–15. 
 122. Id. at 414–15. 
 123. Id. at 415–17. 
 124. Id. at 420–21. 
 125. Id. at 421–22. 
 126. Id. at 421. 
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highest, and the employee’s interest in self-expression is at its lowest, 
when the speech is itself a job responsibility, as with Ceballos’s memo and 
testimony, both of which would be routine parts of a deputy district 
attorney’s responsibilities.127  Because of the government’s overriding 
interests, including consistency and accuracy in promulgating the 
agency’s message, the Court found that statements made pursuant to 
official duties cease to be protected by the First Amendment at all, and the 
employer may freely regulate those statements without needing any 
justification.128 
The pronouncement that some employee speech is entirely beyond the 
reach of the Constitution fueled fears of an “open season” on 
whistleblowers who, like Ceballos, exercise independent professional 
judgment in the face of agency action they perceive as wrongful.  One 
commentator fretted that the ruling “has now made it nearly impossible 
for conscientious public servants to speak out in the best interests of the 
public without jeopardizing their careers.”129  Another stated: “[T]he 
Garcetti rule works as a bludgeon against public employee speech when a 
scalpel offers a more appropriate tool for parsing government’s legitimate 
expressive interests in its workers’ on-duty speech.”130  Other analysts, 
focusing on the setting in which Ceballos’s speech occurred—in a memo 
assigned by a supervisor—theorized that the case might not have much 
effect at all on claims brought by people who “blow the whistle” externally 
to a public audience.131 
                                                          
 127. Id. at 422. 
 128. See id. at 422–23 (“Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an 
employee in his or her professional capacity.  Official communications have official consequences, 
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity.  Supervisors must ensure that their employees’ 
official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s 
mission.”). 
 129. Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal 
Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 117 (2008); see also id. at 127 (observing that, because the 
takeaway from Garcetti is that speakers are better-protected if they immediately go to the public with 
their concerns rather than proceed through in-house dispute-resolution channels, “this state of affairs 
leads to a tremendous waste of judicial resources on unnecessary litigation that might have been 
resolved internally”). 
 130. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ 
Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 (2009) (proposing, as an alternative 
approach, that speech pursuant to governmental duties should lose First Amendment protection only 
when the employee is hired for the purposes of expressing the government’s message and is doing so 
in a way that would be transparent to the audience, as in the case of a press secretary hired by a school 
board). 
 131. See, e.g., Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the 
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 147–48 
(2009) (suggesting that the Garcetti ruling “may not effectuate a large change in this area” because its 
holding “may not apply when the employee speaks or complains outside the chain of command”). 
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Notably, the Garcetti majority, harkening back to Pickering’s facts, 
explicitly mentioned “writing a letter to a local newspaper” as the type of 
speech that would likely be unaffected by the Court’s newly recognized 
standard.132  The majority appeared to draw a distinction between speech 
that could occur uniquely within the government workplace, which would 
be unprotected, versus speech that could come from a citizen outsider, 
which would remain protected.133 
Since Garcetti, the question of when speech qualifies as “pursuant to 
official duties” has been litigated extensively, with frustratingly 
inconsistent results.134  Some courts have faithfully applied Garcetti in 
accordance with its plain language and found that speech to journalists or 
to the general public does not lose First Amendment protection unless the 
speech is itself a work assignment.  Thus, when a New Hampshire tax 
assessor lost his job over comments in a newspaper interview in which he 
questioned the fairness of the tax system, the state Supreme Court confined 
the reach of Garcetti to the scope of the assessor’s duties enumerated in 
his official job description, which “does not indicate that the plaintiff is 
required to communicate with the public on any matter other than the 
office’s procedures and techniques.”135  The comments thus fell beyond 
the scope of Garcetti and could be protected.136 
But at times, courts have aggressively construed Garcetti to reach 
speech that relates to the subject matter of the employee’s work, or that 
would not exist but-for the speaker’s employment, even when the speech 
was far from being a routine duty to which the employee would be 
assigned.137  For example, the Seventh Circuit found that a Milwaukee 
                                                          
 132. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. 
 133. See id. (“Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing their 
official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of activity 
engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.”).  The Tenth Circuit applied this 
distinction in rejecting the First Amendment claim of a lab technician at a state detention center who 
internally challenged the reliability of the center’s drug tests, stating that the employee “was not 
communicating with newspapers or her legislators or performing some similar activity afforded 
citizens.”  Green v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794, 796–97, 800 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 134. For criticism of the uncertain state of employee speech rights left in Garcetti’s wake, see Paul 
M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1133 
(2008) (commenting that “Garcetti is a prime example of poor judicial reasoning and opinion writing” 
that has invited misapplication to the detriment of employee speakers); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 
Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1193–94 (2007) (“Rather than the relatively stable balancing process that had 
become familiar in these cases, the lower courts are now confronted with an inexact classification 
prerequisite that is already generating unpredictable results.”). 
 135. Snelling v. City of Claremont, 931 A.2d 1272, 1277–78, 1281 (N.H. 2007). 
 136. Id. at 1281. 
 137. See Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 
311 (2015) (“Some lower courts, relying on Garcetti’s statement that speech is unprotected when it 
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police officer who reported to the local prosecutor’s office that his boss 
had been helping her fugitive brother evade arrest on an outstanding drug 
warrant did not have a First Amendment claim for his retaliatory 
reassignment to undesirable duties.138  The court held that, because police 
department policy required officers to report all crimes they became aware 
of, and because the conversation between the officer and the prosecutor 
occurred during an official-duty meeting to go over an arrest report, the 
speech was made in the officer’s official capacity and entitled to no First 
Amendment protection.139 
Whether the employee was punished for speech internal to the agency 
or speech made to the public has proven to be an influential and at times 
decisive consideration.  When speech is simply reported to co-workers or 
supervisors through a routine workplace chain-of-command, it is more 
likely to be regarded as on-duty Garcetti speech, and when speech is 
conveyed to a larger public audience, it is more likely to be protected.140  
A number of post-Garcetti cases have explicitly made this distinction, 
protecting employees because they directed their complaints externally to 
the news media.141  As the Fifth Circuit summarized it, in the case of a 
University of Texas employee who complained both internally and 
externally about what she perceived to be management’s indifference to 
employees’ use of computers to view pornography: 
Cases from other circuits are consistent in holding that when a public 
employee raises complaints or concerns up the chain of command at his 
workplace about his job duties, that speech is undertaken in the course 
of performing his job. . . .  If however a public employee takes his job 
concerns to persons outside the work place in addition to raising them up 
the chain of command at his workplace, then those external 
communications are ordinarily not made as an employee, but as a 
citizen.142 
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This approach has some logical appeal.  Reporting problems to 
supervisors is far more likely to fall within an employee’s routine job 
duties than speaking with the news media.  However, as Justice John Paul 
Stevens noted in his Garcetti dissent, the resulting incentive system 
rewards employees who deviate from internal operating procedures and 
take their complaints public and penalizes those who quietly attempt to 
resolve problems in-house.143 
Notwithstanding the widely recognized distinction between “internal” 
and “external” complaints, employers have at times been permitted to 
discipline employees who speak to the media, if providing information to 
the media can be regarded as part of the employee’s official duties. 
For example, in Foley v. Town of Randolph, a municipal fire chief lost 
his First Amendment challenge to a suspension imposed in response to his 
comments to the media at the scene of a fatal fire, claiming that the city 
had deprived the fire department of essential funding and manpower.144  
Even though the chief’s job description said nothing about speaking to the 
media, the court found the speech unprotected under Garcetti, because the 
chief was in uniform and on duty at an official press conference convened 
by the state fire marshal, and he “would naturally be regarded as the public 
face of the Department when speaking about matters involving the 
Department.”145  Similarly, in Hurst v. Lee County, the Fifth Circuit held 
that a corrections officer, who made statements to the media about the 
arrest of a college football player, “was not speaking as a citizen for First 
Amendment purposes, and consequently his communications were not 
constitutionally insulated from employer discipline.”146  Although the 
officer insisted that speaking to the media was not part of his official 
duties, the court was persuaded otherwise, because the sheriff maintained 
a “media relations policy” that allowed the officer to release certain types 
of information to journalists about arrestees, and to release even more 
information after receiving supervisory approval; thus, his job duties in 
fact contemplated that the officer would speak to the media.147 
Cases involving speech to journalists are rare.  Far more commonly, 
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employees are disciplined for whistleblowing speech to regulators or to 
government overseers.  In that scenario, which might be analogized to 
speaking with journalists, employees’ First Amendment claims have fared 
relatively well.  For instance, in Dahlia v. Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit 
held that a police officer spoke as a citizen in disclosing his fellow officers’ 
misconduct to the department’s Internal Affairs unit.148  That the employee 
made his report to others “outside of his chain of command” was 
considered a persuasive factor in determining that the speech was not made 
pursuant to his official duties.149  Similarly, in Freitag v. Ayers, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a correctional officer’s reports of a sexually hostile 
working environment were protected when made to a state senator and to 
the state Inspector General, but unprotected when contained in a memo 
written to her direct supervisors.150 
The post-Garcetti line of cases involving punishment for comments to 
the media illustrates two realities.  First, if speaking to the media is part of 
an employee’s job description, doing that job inconsistently with the 
employer’s wishes will be unprotected speech.  Second, it will be easier 
for an employer to justify individually applied punishment for speech to 
the media that causes workplace disharmony than to justify a categorical 
prohibition on unapproved speech. 
Garcetti might seem to leave a gaping hole between, on the one hand, 
speech that is pursuant to official duties, and on the other hand, speech as 
a citizen addressing a matter of public concern (that is to say, Pickering 
speech).  If given just two ill-fitting choices, courts understandably may 
be inclined to shoehorn all job-related speech into the unprotected 
category.  But that is unfaithful to the Garcetti majority’s own admonition 
that not all speech about work is work.151  Properly understood, Garcetti 
is about speech that only the government employee would have the ability 
to engage in by virtue of official authority—that is, writing an internal 
memo assessing the flaws of a prosecution, not writing a letter-to-the-
editor.152 
Crucially for purposes of pre-enforcement challenges to employer gag 
policies, Garcetti involved an as-applied challenge to disciplinary action 
for a particular instance of expression.  NTEU, on the other hand, was a 
facial challenge to a categorical prohibition on certain employee speech.  
Although Garcetti is widely perceived to have strengthened the 
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employer’s hand in punishing employees who stray “off-message” in their 
official speech, nothing in the ruling disturbs NTEU nor defensibly can be 
interpreted as giving sanction to blanket prohibitions on speech about 
work-related matters. 
B. Gag Orders Post-Garcetti 
Since Garcetti, published rulings addressing the constitutionality of 
workplace gag rules have been infrequent, making it difficult to assess 
whether the case has influenced judges’ analysis.  Garcetti played no role 
in resolving a 2008 facial challenge to an Alabama fire department’s 
policy that forbade officers from discussing work-related matters with the 
news media and the city council.153  In that case, an Alabama district court, 
without citing Garcetti, relied on NTEU and Harman to conclude that the 
policy was a facially overbroad prior restraint, because it made no 
exception for matters of public concern, such as complaints about 
inadequate staffing.154 
In a 2013 case influenced by Garcetti, a District of Columbia judge 
rejected a facial challenge to a police department policy forbidding 
officers from making unauthorized statements to the public “pertaining to 
Department policies, procedures, rules, personnel issues and direction.”155  
The policy was comparable to—and in fact, more encompassing than—a 
D.C. fire department policy struck down as unconstitutional, pre-Garcetti, 
by a different District of Columbia judge two decades earlier.156  
Nevertheless, the police department gag rule survived scrutiny based on 
what might be called a “Garcetti savings clause,” specifying that 
“participating in an interview to express personal views” was outside the 
scope of the restrictions.157  The employee ultimately prevailed on the as-
applied portion of his challenge, because the court found that speaking 
with the media was not part of his job duties, rejecting the police 
department’s invitation to apply the Garcetti rule broadly to any speech 
that “owed its existence” to his job or was “related to” his duties.158 
Regardless of whether Garcetti undermined the vitality of NTEU—a 
case that the Garcetti majority mentioned only twice, in passing—the 
reality is that Garcetti fueled a mindset among government managers and 
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their counsel that the courts would view restrictions on employee speech 
deferentially.  As one media-law professor wrote in assessing the first five 
years of post-Garcetti caselaw: “The result has been ad hoc, inconsistent 
and unpredictable outcomes that could easily chill the flow of vital 
information to the public . . . .  Garcetti may therefore deter even 
heretofore willing, nonconfidential government sources from cooperating 
with journalists and providing critical information about the functioning 
of government.”159  Leaving aside the relatively rare facial challenge to a 
blanket restraint, employers have in fact enjoyed tremendous deference in 
the more commonplace case of workers challenging discipline for specific 
instances of work-related speech.160 
C. Lane v. Franks: Putting Garcetti Back in the Bottle 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Lane v. Franks,161 involving a 
whistleblower punished for testifying about corruption in the Alabama 
community college system, reinforces the narrow view of Garcetti that 
speech does not lose its protection solely because it is about workplace 
issues or is based on knowledge gained in the workplace.162 
In Lane, the former director of a community college’s program for 
underprivileged youth brought a First Amendment retaliation claim 
against the president of Central Alabama Community College 
(“CACC”).163  As director, Edward Lane audited the program’s expenses 
and discovered that Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama state legislator on the 
payroll for the program, had not been reporting for work and terminated 
her.164  Her firing drew the attention of federal authorities, who opened an 
investigation leading to Schmitz’s indictment on charges of mail fraud and 
theft.165  Lane testified, under subpoena, before a federal grand jury about 
why he removed Schmitz.166  Shortly afterward, President Steve Franks 
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fired Lane as part of what he termed a financial austerity cutback, although 
evidence emerged casting doubt on the veracity of that explanation.167 
Lane challenged his removal as a violation of his First Amendment 
rights, but the lower courts dispensed with the case on Garcetti grounds.168  
In a short unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals 
observed that Lane’s testimony “touched only on acts he performed as part 
of his official duties,” and concluded that “because formal job descriptions 
do not control, that Lane’s official duties did not distinctly require him to 
testify at criminal trials falls short of triggering First Amendment 
protection.”169 
The Supreme Court reversed.170  The justices held that Lane’s grand 
jury testimony fell outside the scope of his ordinary job duties and thus 
was entitled to First Amendment protection: “Truthful testimony under 
oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is 
speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.  That is so even when 
the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information 
learned during that employment.”171  The Court explained: 
Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of 
speech as a citizen for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court 
bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth . . . .  
That independent obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen 
and sets it apart from speech made purely in the capacity of an 
employee.172 
The Court distinguished its holding from Garcetti, noting that 
“Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply relates to public 
employment or concerns information learned in the course of public 
employment.”173  The majority framed the “critical” question under 
Garcetti as “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”174  
In its most crucial observation, the Lane Court clarified the inartful and 
misunderstood Garcetti phrase (“speech that owes its existence to a public 
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employee’s professional responsibilities”)175 by stating that “the mere fact 
that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his 
public employment does not transform that speech into employee—rather 
than citizen—speech.”176 
With Garcetti out of the picture, the Court applied the Pickering 
balancing-of-interests test, first noting that Lane’s testimony was speech 
on a matter of public concern—corruption in a publicly funded program 
and misuse of state funds.177  Then the justices looked for the government’s 
legitimate interests in suppressing Lane’s speech—and found nothing: 
“the employer’s side of the Pickering scale is entirely empty.”178 Hence, 
Lane’s removal violated his constitutional rights.179 
The Lane analysis puts a helpfully clarifying gloss on Garcetti 
reemphasizing the literalness of its core holding: that speech loses its First 
Amendment protection only if the speech is itself a work assignment, such 
as Ceballos’s act of writing a legal memo to submit to his supervisor, 
Garcetti.180  This makes a potentially decisive difference for employees 
forbidden by their superiors from speaking to the media or penalized after-
the-fact for doing so, because giving interviews rarely will be a part of (to 
use the Lane phrase) an employee’s “ordinary job responsibilities.”181 
D. Gag Orders Post-Lane 
To date, the only appellate court to entertain a facial challenge to a 
blanket gag policy on public employees since Lane concluded that the 
policy was unconstitutionally overbroad, in part relying on Lane. 
In that case, Moonin v. Tice, a Nevada state patrol officer challenged 
a directive forbidding members of his agency’s dog-handling unit from 
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speaking with anyone outside of law enforcement “for the purpose of 
discussing the Nevada Highway Patrol K9 program or interdiction 
program, or direct and indirect logistics therein,” under threat of discipline 
for insubordination.182  The policy was an attempt to dampen criticism of 
the canine program that some perceived as wasteful and ineffective.183 
A district court found the policy so clearly unconstitutional as to defeat 
the individual supervisory defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.184  At 
the Ninth Circuit, the highway patrol’s counsel argued that the policy 
restricted only speech governed by Garcetti—that is, speech in which the 
employee had no individual First Amendment interest—because it was 
meant to restrict only speech in an official capacity.185  The Ninth Circuit 
was unpersuaded.186 
Citing Lane’s admonition that the expert perspectives of government 
insiders are of special value to the public, the Ninth Circuit observed that 
“we may not assume that the troopers speak as employees rather than 
citizens on every occasion in which they discuss information learned or 
opinions developed while on the job.”187 
The court examined the highway patrol’s policy by applying the 
Pickering balancing-of-interests test, with the qualifier that prior restraints 
bear an especially heavy burden of justification.188  While it was not 
entirely clear what level of scrutiny the court applied, the opinion found 
the directive wanting because it lacked a “close and rational relationship 
to the department’s legitimate interests.”189  The judges found the agency’s 
primary stated justification for the ban—“ensuring effective operation of 
the agency without disruption”—to be speculative: 
Although it could be true that police departments would operate more 
efficiently absent inquiry into their practices by the public and the 
legislature, efficiency grounded in the avoidance of accountability is not, 
in a democracy, a supervening value.  Avoiding accountability by reason 
of persuasive speech to other governmental officials and the public is not 
an interest that can justify curtailing officers’ speech as citizens on 
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matters of public concern.190 
The Fourth Circuit, in a comparable case involving a police 
department’s prohibition on unflattering comments on social media, 
likewise applied the NTEU standard and invalidated the policy.  In 
Liverman v. City of Petersburg, two Virginia police officers who ran afoul 
of their employer for venting on Facebook about perceived inequities in 
their department’s promotion policies challenged the “Negative 
Comments” policy under which they were disciplined.191  The policy 
stated, in pertinent part, “Negative comments on the internal operations of 
the [agency], or specific conduct of supervisors or peers that impacts the 
public’s perception of the department is not protected by the First 
Amendment free speech clause, in accordance with established case 
law.”192 
Officers Herbert Liverman and Vance Richards were reprimanded and 
put on disciplinary probation, disqualifying them from a round of 
promotion opportunities, after a string of back-and-forth Facebook posts 
complaining that inexperienced officers were receiving undeserved 
promotions and questioning the department’s leadership.193  They 
challenged both the imposition of discipline and the policy itself as facially 
unconstitutional.194 
The district court entered summary judgment for Liverman on his 
facial challenge to the policy, but dismissed all other claims.195  On appeal, 
the police department’s counsel conceded that NTEU, not Garcetti, 
supplied the proper legal standard for analyzing a blanket policy 
restraining speech.196  Applying NTEU—and without reference to Lane—
the Fourth Circuit found that the “Negative Comments” policy 
unconstitutionally restricted speech.197  Reversing the district court, the 
judges further found that the police chief could not claim qualified 
immunity from damages for imposing discipline, because the officers’ 
First Amendment right to be free from viewpoint discrimination was 
clearly established.198 
In short, there is no indication that federal courts widely understand 
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Garcetti to have legitimized broadly worded prohibitions against 
discussing workplace matters.  To the contrary, such policies remain 
constitutionally infirm and vulnerable to facial challenge. 
V. UNBRIDLED DISCRETION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Even if a rule requiring employees to obtain supervisory approval 
before speaking with the media could survive a frontal challenge as a prior 
restraint forbidden by NTEU, additional First Amendment concerns 
remain.  When a government agency imposes a permit or licensing system 
as a precondition for engaging in expressive activity, the system is 
unconstitutional if it fails to provide clear and objective standards to 
constrain the decisionmaker’s discretion.199  Permitting systems that afford 
the regulator “unbridled discretion” are regularly invalidated.200 
The Supreme Court first recognized in Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organization that open-ended permitting systems offend the 
First Amendment because they enable the decisionmaker to ration the right 
to speak based on subjective, and potentially viewpoint-discriminatory, 
considerations.201  The Hague case challenged the decision of a New 
Jersey police department to deny applications from Communist political 
groups to use a municipal meeting hall, relying on an ordinance that 
empowered the police chief to withhold a permit “for the purpose of 
preventing riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.”202  The Court 
struck down the permitting ordinance, finding that, without objective 
standards to constrain the police chief’s exercise of authority, the 
ordinance could “be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free 
expression.”203 
Similarly, in Cox v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court vacated a civil 
rights demonstrator’s conviction on a charge of obstructing a public 
sidewalk, because the statute under which he was convicted gave 
“unfettered discretion” to municipal authorities to decide which uses of 
public property for expressive purposes were or were not punishable.204  
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Writing for the Court’s 7–2 majority, Justice Arthur Goldberg found that 
the statute, while facially neutral, had in fact been applied in a  
 
discriminatory way: 
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine 
which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to 
engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by 
use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing 
power or, as in this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective 
enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.205 
To be constitutional, any permitting system imposed as a condition of 
speech must cabin the decisionmaker’s discretion with “neutral criteria to 
insure that the licensing decision is not based on the content or viewpoint 
of the speech being considered.”206 
Gag policies restricting public employees’ communications with news 
media rarely, if ever, offer any standards assuring the speaker that 
permission to speak will be granted without regard to content or viewpoint.  
Indeed, the desire to prevent employees from speaking about subjects their 
supervisors regard as sensitive, controversial, or unfavorable to the image 
of the agency is at times overtly the purpose of the restriction.  Then-Judge 
Alito’s opinion for the Third Circuit invalidating a prior-restraint policy 
constraining Pittsburgh police officers’ speech found the policy to be “so 
open-ended that it creates a danger of improper application.”207  Judge 
Alito stopped short of saying that restrictions on employee speech must be 
scrutinized with the same “degree of precision” that Cox and City of 
Lakewood applied to permitting regimens, but nevertheless found the 
absence of any limiting principles for the police department’s exercise of 
discretion “disturbing.”208 
A Rhode Island district judge likewise found a police department’s 
pre-approval requirement to be infirm, because it gave supervisory 
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officials complete discretion to grant or deny permission for an officer to 
speak to the media about any work-related matter.209  In addition to being 
unconstitutionally overbroad, the order was vulnerable to a First 
Amendment challenge because it “sets no standards to guide the decision-
making process, does not require any explanation for a denial of 
permission to speak, and proposes no time frame for such grant or 
denial.”210 
Applying City of Lakewood, a federal district court in Ohio struck 
down a municipal fire department’s external communications policy as 
facially unconstitutional.211  The policy—which stated that fire department 
officers “may not publicly communicate on matters concerning Mansfield 
Fire Department rules, duties, policies, procedures and practices 
without . . . prior written approval”—flunked First Amendment scrutiny 
because it failed to provide “narrow, objective and definite standards” 
governing whether employees would be permitted to speak.212 
Of the more than 150 federal, state and local-government policies 
examined by Brechner Center researchers in compiling this paper, none 
contained any standards by which an agency decision maker would decide 
whether to grant or deny an interview request.  None of the policies 
provided a time deadline for consideration of requests, or specified any 
route to appeal an adverse decision if the speaker was aggrieved by the 
denial.  Standard government policies, in other words, provide none of the 
objective and neutral criteria that federal courts regard as imperative for a 
speech-restrictive permitting system to be constitutional. 
Whether the same skeptical review that applies in the more traditional 
“permitting” context applies with equal force in the workplace or not, the 
same policy concerns are at play: government officials with unfettered 
discretion to grant or deny permission to speak will be tempted to use that 
discretion in viewpoint-discriminatory ways.  For this additional reason, 
policies requiring public employees to seek approval before discussing 
their work with journalists are unlikely to survive constitutional scrutiny. 
                                                          
 209. Kessler v. City of Providence, 167 F. Supp. 2d 482, 489 (D.R.I. 2001). 
 210. Id. at 489–90. 
 211. Spain v. City of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919, 923 (N.D. Ohio 1996). 
 212. Id. at 922–23 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988)).  
The former assistant fire chief also challenged the policy as applied, alleging he was “forced to retire 
in retaliation for” speaking without authorization about several department governance matters.  Id. at 
923–24.  Applying a Pickering balancing analysis, the court found in favor of the plaintiff and declined 
the city’s motion for summary judgment.  Id.  
2019]  PUTTING THE ‘PUBLIC’ BACK INTO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 35 
VI. GAG ORDERS: PERVASIVENESS AND IMPACT 
When a Nevada State Patrol supervisor was sued over an email 
directive requiring employees to get approval before discussing certain 
work-related matters with the public, the supervisor defended himself by 
showing just how frequently law-enforcement agencies—including his 
own—restrict their employees’ speech.213  Pointing to a State Patrol policy 
that requires approval before releasing any information about the agency, 
the supervisor’s attorneys argued that, if his email was an unlawful prior 
restraint, “then this confidentiality policy is too.  And if [this] policy is, 
then confidentiality policies maintained by police and sheriff offices in 
thousands of cities within the Ninth Circuit are vulnerable to attack as 
illegal ‘prior restraints,’ a First Amendment violation so hateful as to be 
virtually outlawed.”214 
The court in the Nevada patrolman’s case, Moonin v. Tice, was not 
persuaded by this argument.215  Agency policies restraining employee 
speech are as unremarkable as violations of the fifty-five-mph speed limit.  
However, like speeding on the highway, rampant disobedience of the law 
is not a legal defense. 
In Wisconsin, reporters with the Lee Enterprises newspaper chain 
examined the policies of twenty state agencies in 2016 and found that just 
two expressly authorized their employees to speak at will to journalists, 
while five other agencies allowed employees to field only certain types of 
requests.216  The remaining thirteen out of twenty agencies filtered all 
interactions with the news media through a public-relations office; one 
agency directed employees to write down questions received from 
journalists and email them to a media-relations officer to be answered; and 
another provided a script for employees to read if contacted by a reporter 
directing all inquiries to the agency communications director.217  Agency 
communications officers questioned about their policies invariably gave 
comparable responses: funneling calls from journalists to a public-
relations professional ensures that the journalist will be referred to the 
                                                          
 213. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-
16571), 2016 WL 4055435, at *3. 
 214. Id. at *11. 
 215. 868 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 216. Chris Hubbuch, Special Treatment or Limited Access? State Government Policies Dictate 
Who Can Talk to the Press, CHIPPEWA HERALD (Mar. 13, 2016), https://chippewa.com/special-
treatment-or-limited-access/article_4edc5f57-787d-50d3-bb35-2b4c1bc1926b.html 
[https://perma.cc/36PS-76ZQ].  
 217. Id. 
36 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
most knowledgeable employee.218 
A pair of surveys of political reporters, one completed in 2012 by 
journalists covering federal agencies and another completed in 2014 by 
journalists assigned to state and local agencies, indicates that 
“gatekeeping” by government public-relations offices is widespread.219  
About eighty-five percent of federal reporters and seventy-six percent of 
state-and-local reporters agreed with the researchers’ survey statement: 
“The public is not getting all the information it needs because of barriers 
agencies are imposing on journalists’ reporting practices.”220  Questioned 
on an agree/disagree scale with five signifying strongest agreement and 
one signifying strongest disagreement, local reporters’ agreement scored 
a 3.47 and federal reporters’ agreement scored 3.92 to the statement: “I am 
required to obtain approval from the agency public information officer 
before interviewing agency employees.”221 
The inability of journalists to get direct access to news sources became 
such a persistent source of frustration to journalists that, in 2017, the 
Society of Professional Journalists (“SPJ”) adopted a resolution at its 
annual national convention denouncing what SPJ called “mandat[ory] 
clearance culture,” stating that “restrictions on access pose a grave risk to 
the public welfare.”222  The resolution followed a series of unsuccessful 
attempts to persuade the Obama White House to loosen constraints on 
federal employees and end the involvement of agency public-relations 
managers in pre-approving and monitoring interviews.223 
While doubtfully legal, wholesale prohibitions on unapproved media 
interviews persist across all levels of government.  Researchers from the 
Brechner Center searched online through the published media-relations 
policies of hundreds of federal, state, and local agencies, and found dozens 
that run afoul of the standard established by the Supreme Court in NTEU 
and the lower-court cases applying it.224 
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A. Gag Policies at Federal Agencies 
Constraints on federal employee speech did not originate with Donald 
Trump’s election in 2016.  In a 2008 report, the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (“UCS”) examined the media policies of fifteen federal agencies 
with an eye toward whether federal scientists could freely talk to the media 
about their areas of expertise without interference from agency 
management.225  The report found a range of agency practices, both formal 
and informal, that interfered with employees’ ability to have unfiltered 
access to journalists—although only one, the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, actually published a nationwide policy requiring employees 
to route all media contacts to the agency’s public-relations office.226  
Around the same time, the New York Times reported that federal 
immigration judges, who are appointed by the Justice Department, were 
under orders not to speak to the media.227 
During 2010, an employee-rights watchdog group obtained and 
published a directive from the head of public relations for the 
Monongahela National Forest, who told agency employees: 
[W]e remain under strict instructions for talking with the media.  So, a 
reminder: If you receive media calls that fall under the following 
categories you cannot talk to the reporter, but should instead get their 
contact info and get in touch with me: 1. contacts by a member of the 
national media on ANY subject 2. contacts by a local or regional reporter 
seeking information about a national issue including policy and budget 
issues.228 
During the Obama administration, Washington Post reporters 
encountered restrictive agency policies when trying to report on the 
struggle to reduce patient wait times at Veterans Administration (“VA”) 
hospitals.229  The Post heard from several VA physicians who reported that 
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a patient “benefits card” meant to expedite treatment was causing 
confusion among patients and providers that actually delayed treatment.230  
But the Post was unable to quote any of the doctors by name “because VA 
employees are not allowed to speak to the media without permission.”231 
Public attention to federal employees’ free-speech rights intensified 
after Trump assumed the presidency in January 2017, both because the 
constraints played into a larger narrative of Trump’s hostility toward the 
news media and because the constraints were perceived as part of a 
strategy to undercut authoritative discussion about climate change.  The 
open-government nonprofit, Sunlight Foundation, documented a wave of 
directives issued across federal agencies around the time of Trump’s 
inauguration instructing federal employees to cease responding to requests 
for information, posting information to social media, or otherwise making 
statements to the public about agency business without express orders 
from the new administration.232 
Agency policies often are ambiguous and could reasonably be 
interpreted to require pre-approval of all interactions with the news media, 
a practice that federal courts have declared unconstitutionally broad.  
Guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services as the 
Trump administration took office emphasize that subject-matter experts 
within the agency should be made accessible for interviews, but goes on 
to say: 
In order to make certain we provide the media the best possible service 
and information in a timely fashion, it is important that the relevant 
agency public affairs office be notified of all media calls/contacts that 
employees receive about their HHS work. 
Reporters should be informed that the agency’s public affairs office 
coordinates media requests to ensure they receive requested information 
within their deadline.  The primary objective for routing reporter calls to 
the agency public affairs office is to ensure an effective, timely and 
coordinated agency and departmental response.233 
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The reference to “routing” reporters through the public-affairs 
coordinator leaves the strong impression that it is mandatory for 
employees to seek clearance from a public-relations officer before 
replying to a journalist’s query. 
Even where agencies’ policies, on paper, appear compliant with the 
NTEU standard, they may operate very differently in practice.  Scientific 
American reported that, although the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) tells employees not to seek “clearance” from the 
CDC public-relations office before providing information to reporters, the 
CDC policy was undercut by an August 2017 email memorandum from a 
CDC administrator.234  The email, first published by the news organization 
Axios, told employees: 
Effective immediately and until further notice, any and all 
correspondence with any member of the news media, regardless of the 
nature of the inquiry, must be cleared through CDC’s Atlanta 
Communications Office. . . .  This correspondence includes everything 
from formal interview requests to the most basic of data requests.235 
Columbia Journalism Review called the apparent shift in accessibility 
of CDC experts part of “an expanding information blockade” under the 
Trump administration that affected all health- and science-related 
agencies.236 
B. Gag Policies at State Agencies 
Agencies of state government frequently instruct their employees that 
they are forbidden from unapproved interactions with journalists, making 
no distinction between communications in an official (Garcetti) capacity 
as part of official duties versus communications as an individual 
addressing a matter of public concern.  Brechner Center researchers found 
broadly speech-restrictive policies readily available on the websites of 
dozens of state government agencies across the country and obtained 
others by way of freedom-of-information requests for agency manuals, 
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handbooks, or employment contracts.237 
The Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice, an agency of more than 
2,300 employees working at twenty-six facilities and ninety-seven 
community services offices throughout the state, instructs: 
Any employee who receives a media inquiry must: 1. Refer the inquirer 
to the Office of Communications; and 2. Promptly notify the Office of 
Communications through his/her chain of command. 
Staff may not contact media, furnish information to the media, or speak 
on behalf of the Department without prior approval of the Director of 
Communications, Assistant Commissioner, or Commissioner.238 
A sister agency, the Georgia Department of Public Health, instructed 
its employees in a Media Relations Policy memorandum dated September 
2014: “DPH employees should not respond to requests for information 
from the news media in any capacity. . . .  All media inquiries must be 
referred to the Communications Division.”239  The qualifier “in any 
capacity” clearly constrains employees from engaging in constitutionally 
protected expression that is not made pursuant to official duties. 
Regulations governing employees of Maryland’s state prison division 
provide: “An employee of a Division facility shall refer all media inquiries 
to the warden.  The warden shall determine whether media inquiries will 
be forwarded to the Public Information Office of the Division.”240  In 
Montana, similarly, prison employees are told to “refer all media inquiries 
about official MSP business to the PIO or Warden,” and not to speak to 
the media “unless specifically requested to do so by the Warden or the 
PIO.”241 
Journalists covering state government regularly report that they have 
been told employees are off-limits to be interviewed, though it is 
frequently unclear whether the restraint carries the force of a formal 
regulation or is merely a workplace norm.  Amid a swirl of media attention 
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to sexual harassment in state legislatures across the country, the chief of 
staff for the Colorado Senate distributed a memo reminding Senate staffers 
that, unless approved by Senate leadership, “no Senate employee, 
including aides, interns and volunteers may grant interviews to the 
press.”242  A teacher working in a Florida prison who was asked about her 
working conditions told the New York Times that employees are “not 
authorized to speak to the news media.”243 
Some agencies do make an effort to distinguish between employee 
communications in an official capacity on behalf of the employer versus 
speech in an individual capacity.  The Arizona Department of Corrections, 
for instance, tells employees that only designated high-ranking officials 
are authorized to speak to the media “on behalf of the Department,” but 
then goes on to say that “[a]ny Department employee may speak with the 
media about personal issues or to express their personal opinions about 
Department operations in general on their own time.”244 
C. Gag Policies in the Law Enforcement Setting 
State and local law-enforcement agencies have been the source of 
most of the employee-speech litigation over the past half-century, yet they 
persist in threatening to sanction employees caught discussing work-
related information without approval. 
A policy manual for the Florida Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles instructs Highway Patrol employees that they “must not 
discuss department matters with the media” unless speaking to journalists 
is part of their official job duties or they are instructed to do so by the 
agency’s executive director or communications director.245  The Texas 
Department of Public Safety tells its officers that “all media contacts 
received by DPS employees shall be immediately forwarded” to the 
agency’s Media and Communications Office, with the sole exception that 
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officers on the scene of a traffic incident may furnish “general 
information” if a public-information officer is unavailable.246  A policy 
manual for the New Jersey State Police authorizes officers to speak to the 
media only about the basic facts of “routine” matters concerning traffic 
incidents and minor crimes, but otherwise requires that all “non-routine” 
communications with the media be filtered through the agency’s public 
information office.247  The definition of “non-routine” information that 
may not be discussed with the news media without approval explicitly 
includes “[i]nquiries about policies, procedures, personnel, etc.,” adding 
that officers may not offer “comments, opinions, assumptions, sarcasm, or 
language that may be interpreted in a way contrary to the intent of the 
speaker.”248  In Utah, officers of the Department of Public Safety “are 
required to coordinate any and all news media requests through the 
department PIO” and are typically permitted to speak to the media “after 
coordinating with the PIO.”249 
Comparable policies abound at city and county-level police agencies.  
Officers in Buffalo, New York, told a reporter investigating the death of a 
pedestrian run over by a police cruiser that they were not authorized to 
speak to the media.250  The rulebook for police officers in Framingham, 
Massachusetts, states that “[a]ny officer may give information to media 
personnel with prior approval from the P.I.O. or the Chief.”251  In the town 
of Truro, Massachusetts, the published handbook for police officers states 
that only specified high-ranking officers may release information to the 
media or others outside the department.252  The Fairfax Police Department 
in Virginia requires that the agency’s Media Relations Bureau “approve 
any request for a Departmental employee to be interviewed by any media 
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outlet.”253  None of these policies are reconcilable with NTEU or more than 
a dozen lower-court cases applying the NTEU standard in the context of 
public-safety agencies, demonstrating that government policymakers 
either widely misunderstand or widely ignore their legal obligations when 
it comes to employee speech rights. 
Indeed, even the Nevada Highway Patrol—the agency that just lost a 
First Amendment challenge to overly restrictive employee-speech policies 
in 2017254— still appears to have such policies in force.  As part of a fifty-
state survey of state police agencies conducted during March and April 
2019, Brechner Center researchers asked the Nevada Department of Public 
Safety for its current policy on employee communications with the news 
media.255  In response, the agency produced four pages from a 
departmental policy manual dated 2018—the year after the adverse ruling 
from the Ninth Circuit—stating in pertinent part: “At no time shall any 
employee of this Department make any comment or release any official 
information to the media without prior approval from a supervisor or the 
designated Department media representative.”256  That policy bears the 
imprint of a commercial vendor of policy handbooks, and the same 
wording can be found at police agencies across the country using the same 
vendor, including those in Peoria, Arizona;257 Urbana, Illinois;258 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts;259 and West Valley City, Utah.260 
D. Gag Policies by Colleges and K-12 Schools 
Broad restrictions on employee speech are routine at public higher 
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educational institutions.261  Employees regularly are told, without 
exception, that all communications with the news media must be filtered 
through an institutional public-relations or marketing office.  A policy 
posted by Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville is typical: 
If you are contacted by a member of the media, you should refer the 
inquiry to University Marketing and Communications (UMC) for an 
official statement . . . .  If you are needed as a subject matter expert, we 
will coordinate schedules, assist you in developing talking points and 
prepare you for the interview.262 
The University of Maryland–Baltimore College provides in its media-
relations policy, which carries the approval of a university vice president, 
that “[a]ll media communications must be channeled through either the 
Associate Vice President for Communications or the Director of Media 
Public Relations in the Office of Communications.”263  The media policy 
at the University of Alabama–Birmingham requires employees who are 
contacted by journalists to “immediately” notify the Office of University 
Relations, directs reporters to contact the University Relations office for 
approval to interview employees, and—for good measure—threatens 
reporters with removal from campus by police if they enter the premises 
without approval from University Relations authorities.264  In addition to 
blanket campus-wide gag policies, athletic departments commonly 
enforce even more rigid controls over interactions with journalists, both 
by members of the coaching staff and by student-athletes.265  This results 
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 263. UNIV. OF MD., POLICY 570.10: PUBLIC RELATIONS (Sept. 16, 2002), 
https://www.umuc.edu/administration/policies-and-reporting/policies/external-relations/public-
relations.cfm [https://perma.cc/D5WC-RCHQ]. 
 264. UNIV. OF ALA. AT BIRMINGHAM, MEDIA POLICY GUIDELINES 2–5 (Nov. 2015), https://www. 
uab.edu/news/images/Media_Policy_Guidelines_11302015.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE3N-BN2B]. 
 265. See, e.g., Jake Elman, Lane Kiffin’s FAU Owls Take Page from Alabama to Help Beat Down Rivals, 
PALM BEACH POST (Nov. 1, 2017, 12:01 AM), http://gm5-lkweb.newscyclecloud.com/sports/college-
football/lane-kiffin-fau-owls-takes-page-from-alabama-help-beat-down-rivals/8J27A8NMRDHqnN8NaH 
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in the bizarre anomaly that news stories about noteworthy athletes often 
must be written without comments from the athletes. 
Constraints on employee speech are commonplace at two-year 
institutions as well.  Arizona’s Pima Community College published a 
directive to employees in 2015 instructing them to refer all media inquiries 
to the college’s public-relations office.266  The policy states, in pertinent 
part: “Notify us immediately if you receive a media inquiry, and do not 
grant an interview or provide any information.”267  Texas’s San Jacinto 
College instructs employees, “[a]ll media relations requests and actions 
flow through the Marketing, Public Relations, and Government Affairs 
department,” and that if contacted by a reporter, “the employee should 
direct the reporter to the Vice President, Marketing and Public 
Relations.”268  The policy also directs employees to notify college 
management if they see a news photographer or videographer on the 
campus unaccompanied by a public-relations representative.269  A sister 
two-year institution in Texas, Panola College, states in its Media 
Interviews policy: “Employee [sic] who are contacted by a reporter and 
have not received a media referral notice from the Office of Institutional 
Advancement must refer the reporter’s request back to the Office of 
Institutional Advancement,” and also provides that any reporter on campus 
who has not been “cleared” must be reported to college authorities.270 
Even where institutions stop short of making it a punishable offense 
to speak to the media without approval, their policies may create the 
impression that unapproved interviews are forbidden.  For instance, the 
University of Houston’s news media policy provides that “all media 
inquiries should be channeled through the Office of University Media 
Relations,” and goes on to state that “[w]hen an employee or department 
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exploits of high-achieving Oklahoma State University football star who, because of athletic department 
policies, was not allowed to give an interview). 
 266. Carol Ann Alaimo, New PCC Policy Bans Employees Talking to Media, ARIZ. DAILY STAR 
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 268. SAN JACINTO C., PROCEDURE VII.7001.A.a, PUBLIC RELATIONS (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.sanjac.edu/procedure-vii7001aa-public-relations [https://perma.cc/93DZ-8GYS]. 
 269. Id.  
 270. PANOLA COLL., VISUAL COMMUNICATION GUIDE: MEDIA INTERVIEWS, https://www.panola. 
edu/faculty-and-staff/visual-comm-guide/interviews.html [https://perma.cc/S9JL-4MV4]. 
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is contacted by the news media, he/she is strongly encouraged to notify 
University Media Relations immediately, before providing any 
information or responding to questions.”271  The same “strongly 
encouraged” admonition appears in a comparable policy disseminated by 
the University of Southern Indiana.272  Many other institutions maintain 
restrictive policies about speaking to the media only at times of 
“emergency” or “crisis.”  A prototypical example is on the books at the 
University of Louisville, which tells its employees: “No one is authorized 
to speak to the news media in a crisis without clearance from the Office of 
Communications and Marketing.”273  Similarly, Montana State University 
identifies categories of “sensitive” or “controversial” issues that 
employees should not address with the news media, including “1) legal 
issues, 2) personnel issues, 3) questions that involve university integrity, 
such as ethics or issues that may result in harm to others, or 4) a campus 
crisis or emergency.”274  A comparable policy at Texas State University 
enumerates seven categories of media query that must be referred to the 
Office of Media Relations, among them: inquiries about “a university-
wide matter or policy,” questions about “a controversial or sensitive 
matter,” and inquiries about “a matter of proposed or alleged university 
policy.”275  While perhaps more defensible than absolute prohibitions, 
these category-specific policies also invite challenge as overbroad or 
viewpoint-discriminatory, since subjects such as “ethics” or “university 
integrity” may be topics on which employees have opinions they care to 
share as individuals. 
Some institutions more carefully tread the First Amendment line, 
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 272. UNIV. OF S. IND., UNIVERSITY COMMUNICATIONS: NEWS MEDIA POLICY, https://www.usi. 
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 273. UNIV. OF LOUISVILLE, OFFICE OF UNIV. ADVANCEMENT, CRISIS COMMUNICATION AT THE 
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_comm/ [https://perma.cc/8JBR-KLPM].  The policy defines a “crisis” situation as: “A significant 
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 274. MONT. STATE UNIV., MEDIA POLICY GUIDELINES, § 200.00: GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR 
DEALING WITH THE MEDIA, https://www.montana.edu/policy/media_policy/ [https://perma.cc/89U7-GC 
KC].  The Montana State policy is noteworthy because it singles out faculty employees and staff for preferred 
status, freeing them to speak to the media about matters within their expertise but making no such provision 
for non-teaching employees.  Id.  
 275. TEX. STATE UNIV., POLICY AND PROCEDURE STATEMENTS: RESPONDING TO MEDIA 
INQUIRIES § 04.01(c) (June 22, 2017), https://policies.txstate.edu/university-policies/06-05-02.html 
[https://perma.cc/QN6X-4EBK]. 
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asserting control over employees’ speech only when they are acting in an 
official capacity addressing matters of institutional policy.  Texas Tech 
University, for instance, tells faculty they are “encouraged” to speak 
directly to news organizations about their subject-matter expertise, and 
suggests—but does not require—that employees seek assistance from the 
university communications office if faced with a question “of a 
controversial or a questionable nature.”276  It is also common for 
universities to carve out a more-protected status for faculty speakers as 
opposed to non-teaching employees, referencing norms of “academic 
freedom” that are recognized as affording faculty a measure of autonomy 
in matters of teaching and research.277  For example, the University of 
Maine includes a disclaimer in its news-media policy that “faculty may 
respond to media inquiries directly on matters related to their professional 
duties, the functioning of the university, and/or on matters of public 
concern,” subject to Pickering-type standards.278  While this type of policy 
ameliorates some of the harsher effects of gag policies, it does nothing for 
the police officer, bookstore cashier, or the many other non-teaching 
employees on college campuses who have First Amendment rights 
comparable to, if not equal to, those of faculty.279 
The muzzling of college employees has received more media attention 
than at other levels of government, likely owing to a larger national focus 
on the state of free speech on college campuses.280  Heavy-handed control 
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(explaining that courts disagree whether the Constitution affords professors freedom to teach as they 
choose or whether the “right” belongs only to their institutional employer).  
 278. UNIV. OF ME., DIV. OF MKTG. AND COMMC’NS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (2018), 
https://umaine.edu/marketingandcommunications/home/policies-and-procedures/#news 
[https://perma.cc/B9LD-ETJ8]. 
 279. Two federal circuits have put faculty speech into a more-protected category, holding that the 
doctrine of academic freedom relieves faculty of a strict application of the Supreme Court’s 
Connick/Garcetti regimen.  See Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
Garcetti does not apply to faculty speech on matters of scholarship and teaching in a professor’s First 
Amendment retaliation case); Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th 
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stating that “Garcetti would not apply in the academic context of a public university”).  However, 
there is no broad consensus that faculty necessarily have greater First Amendment protection than 
non-teaching staff, and the Supreme Court has not directly spoken to the issue.   
 280. See, e.g., David French, A New Campus Survey Reveals Just How Students are ‘Unlearning 
Liberty,’ NAT’L REV. (Mar. 13, 2018, 3:32 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/a-new-campus-
survey-reveals-just-how-students-are-unlearning-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/6ZVQ-TREM] (discussing a 
survey on how college students viewed free speech in comparison to inclusivity); Kathleen Parker, Trigger 
Warnings, Colleges, and the ‘Swaddled Generation’, WASH. POST (May 19, 2015), https://www. 
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of access to campus newsmakers has provoked backlash when 
enforcement appears provoked by adverse coverage of particular 
controversies.  At the University of North Alabama, following unflattering 
news coverage about the departure of the Vice President for Student 
Affairs, administrators circulated a “reminder” to employees of a policy 
that “requires all media inquiries be sent through [the university 
marketing] office so the proper administrators can examine the faculty and 
staff members’ responses before releasing them to the media.”281  The 
circulation of the “reminder,” followed shortly afterward by the firing of 
the student newspaper’s longtime faculty adviser, provoked a censure 
from the College Media Association and widespread condemnation of the 
university.282  A private institution, Loyola University Chicago, sparked 
outcry by disseminating a policy requiring employees to forward media 
inquiries to the campus public-relations office, which would decide 
whether to approve the interview request.283  The policy was rescinded 
under pressure from journalists, faculty members, and free-speech 
organizations.284 
School districts and individual schools commonly instruct employees 
that they may not discuss work-related matters with journalists, or that 
interviews may be granted only with a district administrator’s approval.  
In May 2019, when a Texas journalism teacher resigned her position in 
protest of heavy-handed censorship by school administrators, she told 
reporters that her teaching contract forbade her from saying anything to 
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[https://perma.cc/CR5Y-NJPN]. 
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the media.285  The Washington Post reported being unable to interview a 
New Jersey schoolteacher about her lawsuit alleging that she was made 
the fall guy for her supervisors’ decision to censor the yearbook, because 
“[t]he district’s media policy bans teachers from talking to reporters 
without the superintendent’s consent.”286  The district’s published policy 
states, in pertinent part: “All inquiries from members of the press will be 
referred to the Superintendent for response.  A staff member who is 
requested to give an interview to a member of the press shall so inform the 
Superintendent, who may request to be present at the interview.”287  
Comparably restrictive media policies are publicly available in schools 
from Pennsylvania288 to Kansas289 to Washington.290  A reporter for the 
Fresno Bee, who authored an acclaimed series of articles about her local 
district’s resistance to providing sex education even as teen pregnancy in 
the district spiked, told the Columbia Journalism Review that, even though 
California has a unique statute entitling journalists to come onto school 
property for newsgathering, her access to interview subjects is tightly 
controlled: 
There is a law about access, but that’s not the world I live in . . . .  If I 
come into any front office at any school and identify myself, they’re not 
going to let me in without calling the district.  If I call a math teacher 
about some cool new program, they will refer to me to the 
communications team.  They allow me great access, but I have to go to 
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Director of Communications and Public Relations.”). 
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them to get that access.291 
E. Gag Policies in Local Government 
City and county agencies, too, commonly restrain employee speech in 
ways irreconcilable with the NTEU standard.  The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
was forced to rely on unnamed sources in describing a 2016 spate of 
attacks on jail guards by inmates, because employees of the Pittsburgh jail 
system are not allowed to speak to the media.292  After winning election as 
mayor of Little Rock, Arkansas, in 2018, Frank Scott Jr. instructed all city 
department heads to route all calls from the news media to his office, a 
practice that the mayor’s communications director called “standard in 
medium to large-sized cities.”293 
Published examples of restrictive employee-speech regulations are 
readily accessible online, enacted by local governments of all sizes and 
levels of sophistication.  A “Communications Policy” disseminated by the 
City of Surprise, Arizona, a suburb of Phoenix, instructs city employees 
that they must inform their department head and the city’s 
communications director of any media contacts, and must never offer 
“personal views” to the media.294  City employees in the Dallas suburb of 
Allen, Texas, are told to “direct media inquiries of any type to his/her 
department director or designated representative,” and even department 
heads are told that they must consult city supervisors or legal counsel 
before addressing “controversial” issues or a range of other subjects 
deemed sensitive, including injuries to city employees, personnel 
problems, or interruptions in city services.295  Another Texas municipality, 
the City of Kerrville, tells its employees: 
An employee contacted by a media representative inquiring about a topic 
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must forward the representative to the Public Information Office, 
provide notice of the contact, and any relevant background information.  
If a decision is made for an employee to answer a representative’s 
questions in person, over the telephone, and/or live, the Public 
Information Office must be involved to assist.296 
In Idaho Falls, a city media-relations policy directs employees to 
“immediately” refer media inquiries to a supervisor, who then must notify 
the public-information office—and then reiterates that the requirement 
especially applies to “sensitive” or “controversial” media inquiries.297 
In sum, regulations on the books at all levels of government forbid 
public employees from discussing their work with the press and public, 
without regard to the weight of First Amendment precedent finding such 
policies unconstitutional. 
VII. CHALLENGING GAG ORDERS 
A. Employee Challenges are Infrequent and Unlikely 
A public employee typically gives no thought in the abstract to the 
“injury” of being constrained from unfettered contact with the news media.  
The interest in speaking with a journalist arises either when the employee 
perceives a problem and reaches out for help engaging with a larger public 
audience, or when the journalist makes the first approach seeking 
information.  In neither scenario is there likely to be much advance notice, 
nor is there likely to be the time to obtain counsel and bring a challenge 
while the information is still current and newsworthy. 
To the extent that an employee will ever be motivated to initiate a 
challenge, it will inevitably be after experiencing adverse employment 
action—which presents its own obstacles.  A jobless employee may be 
unable to hire counsel.  An employee who immediately finds satisfactory 
substitute employment will lack motivation to litigate against the former 
workplace.  And the employee may not be given a full and truthful 
explanation for the adverse action that connects back to the contact with 
news media. 
Moreover, it is rare that the mere act of speaking to a journalist without 
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approval will itself be the motivating factor for an employee’s dismissal.  
It is far more likely that the employer will be aggrieved by the content of 
the speech and not the fact of the conversation, and that the punishment 
will be based on having disparaged the employer, contradicted the 
employer’s desired message, or leaked nonpublic information.298  
Consequently, cases will more probably be tried by applying the Pickering 
line of caselaw to the speaker’s words, rather than as facial challenges to 
the gag policy.  This points to the importance, from an employee-rights 
perspective, of facially challenging policies suspected to be 
unconstitutionally restrictive before they are enforced, so that the more 
protective NTEU standard rather than the Pickering balancing standard 
will apply. 
B. A Roadmap for Third-Party Challenges: Judicial Gag Orders on 
Trial Participants 
Where a speaker wishes to share information, First Amendment 
protections apply to both the speaker and the intended recipient of the 
speech.299  In other words, freedom of speech “necessarily protects the 
right to receive.”300  This right to receive information is a separate, 
independent corollary of the First Amendment speech and press freedoms.  
An “informed citizenry” is “vital to the functioning of a democratic 
society,”301 and thus, “the First Amendment protects the news agencies 
right to receive protected speech.”302  Indeed, “without some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”303 
While there is no indication that news organizations have litigated 
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First Amendment challenges to controls on public employee speech, there 
are parallels in the oft-litigated context of gag orders on trial 
participants.304  In those cases, journalists have had little difficulty 
establishing standing to challenge the breadth of judicial orders banning 
attorneys, parties, and witnesses from speaking with the media.305  
Journalists consequently should have standing to litigate the 
constitutionality of employee gag policies in the absence of a motivated 
employee plaintiff. 
Standing has both constitutional and prudential dimensions.306  A 
litigant presents no constitutionally justiciable question if there is no “case 
or controversy” for the judiciary to redress.307  At times, courts have 
permitted litigants to proceed in a representational capacity on behalf of 
others who are more directly injured but are unable, for practical reasons, 
to assert their own interests,308 such as abortion doctors standing in the 
place of future prospective patients who will not know that they need 
abortion services until the matter is too time-urgent to be litigated.309 
Establishing the existence of a justiciable question requires an injury 
to a legally cognizable interest, a causal connection fairly traceable to the 
wrong that is the subject of the suit, and a substantial likelihood that the 
injury is redressable by an available remedy.310  Prudential standing 
presents a more direct impediment to a journalist asserting a right to 
challenge a restraint on the speech of potential news sources, as the 
doctrine is recognized as presenting a “general prohibition on a litigant’s 
raising another person’s legal rights.”311  To challenge a governmental 
restraint on access to news sources, a journalist plaintiff must satisfy both 
                                                          
 304. See United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 431 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that gag orders may 
be imposed on trial participants if a substantial threat to a fair trial exists); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 
501 U.S. 1030, 1058 (1991) (holding that an attorney’s extrajudicial statements to the media were not 
“substantially likely to cause material prejudice”).   
 305. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 608 (2d Cir. 1988); Davis v. E. Baton Rouge, 
78 F.3d at 927. 
 306. Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 307. See Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing 
and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 394 (1981) (explaining that the only 
constitutional imperative to qualify for standing is that the party suffer a personal “injury in fact” 
traceable to the challenged practice). 
 308. See Tacy F. Flint, Comment, A New Brand of Representational Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1037, 1045–52 (2003) (explaining how courts have allowed both “representational” standing on the 
part of associations whose members individually would have standing, as well as “third party” 
standing in cases where the directly injured party faces hindrances making litigation impracticable). 
 309. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 57 (1976). 
 310. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 311. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
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aspects of the standing doctrine. 
Because a restraint on speech poses such a danger of inhibiting 
speakers into silencing themselves, federal courts have liberally 
entertained facial challenges brought under the First Amendment.312  Thus, 
a plaintiff may challenge a restriction on speech as substantially overbroad 
even if the restriction has some constitutionally permissible 
applications.313 
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, a Nebraska state trial judge 
“entered an order restraining the [news media] from publishing or 
broadcasting accounts of confessions or admissions . . . or facts ‘strongly 
implicative’” of the defendant.314  The Court found that the order was an 
unconstitutional prior restraint in contravention of the principles 
recognized in Near v. Minnesota.315  Acknowledging the potential 
prejudicial impact of publicity on a defendant’s constitutional right to a 
fair trial, the justices suggested that less restrictive curative measures 
would be permissible.316  Nebraska Press built on decades of First 
Amendment precedent invalidating contempt sanctions imposed on 
journalists who published editorials critical of the conduct of pending trials 
or misleading coverage that judges considered prejudicial to ongoing 
trials.317 
Unable to restrain journalists from publishing lawfully gathered 
information about criminal trials, lower courts more commonly have 
attempted instead to restrain parties and their counsel from talking publicly 
about their cases, insisting that silence is necessary to avoid prejudicing 
prospective jurors.318  As in the Nebraska Press case, these restraints-by-
proxy on journalists’ coverage of legal proceedings have proven difficult 
to justify.319 
                                                          
 312. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (“Proof of an abuse of power in the 
particular case has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the constitutionality of a statute 
purporting to license the dissemination of ideas.”). 
 313. Russell H. Falconer, Note, Institutional Rights, Individual Litigants: Standing to Sue Under 
the Press Clause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1237–38 (2009). 
 314. 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976). 
 315. Id. at 570; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). 
 316. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 565. 
 317. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 278 (1941); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 375–77 
(1947). 
 318. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 551–54. 
 319. While this discussion focuses on the ability of journalists to vindicate their interests in access 
to information, trial participants can of course assert their own more clearly protected free-speech 
rights, and have done so successfully when judicially gagged.  See, e.g., Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 
1059, 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 1970) (granting petition of Vietnam War protesters, facing trial on charges 
of ransacking a federal draft office, to vacate their trial judge’s order forbidding the parties or their 
counsel from making any public statement about the case). 
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Although the would-be speaker faces the greatest personal jeopardy 
from a judicial gag order, courts have consistently found that journalists 
have a sufficiently concrete interest in access to lawyers, parties and 
witnesses to establish standing—whether the injury is conceived as one 
directly to the journalist or as derivative of the injury to the trial participant 
who is at risk of contempt sanctions. 
For instance, when a federal district judge in Ohio gagged all 
participants in a series of wrongful death lawsuits arising out of the 
shooting of anti-war demonstrators at Kent State University, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the CBS television network had standing to challenge  
the ban: 
We are not persuaded by the argument that petitioner lacks standing 
because it is not a party to the civil litigation.  The fact remains that its 
ability to gather the news concerning the trial is directly impaired or 
curtailed.  The protected right to publish the news would be of little value 
in the absence of sources from which to obtain it.320 
The appeals court found that the prohibition—which applied not just to 
direct participants, but even extended to “relatives, close friends, and 
associates”—was an unconstitutional prior restraint threatening freedom 
of the press.321 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit found standing for news organizations to 
challenge a district judge’s order directing jurors not to grant interviews 
after their service in a high-profile civil rights lawsuit against police 
officers accused of framing an innocent man for murder.322  Although the 
Albuquerque Journal was not party to the underlying litigation, the judges 
found that the newspaper had standing to intervene “because the court’s 
order impeded its ability to gather news, and that impediment is within the 
zone of interest sought to be protected by the First Amendment.”323  Other 
circuits—even those that ultimately have found gag orders justifiable—
have similarly found that journalists have a cognizable injury when denied 
access to trial participants who are silenced by court order.324 
A practical rationale for entertaining First Amendment claims from 
                                                          
 320. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237–38 (6th Cir. 1975).  
 321. Id. at 236, 239–41.  
 322. Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 323. Id.  
 324. See, e.g., Radio & Television News Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 781 F.2d 
1443, 1445–48 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding sufficient injury to news media to confer standing to challenge 
order restraining criminal trial participants from making any statements about the merits of the case to 
the media, but finding only “very limited incidental” effect on constitutionally protected rights and 
upholding silencing order as reasonable). 
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journalists is that trial participants themselves will have little incentive to 
mount their own challenges.  A witness or juror will not have enough of a 
stake in giving an interview to be motivated to get counsel and sue, and 
even though a party or a party’s counsel might have greater incentive, 
direct participants will be unlikely to risk the trial judge’s wrath by facially 
challenging a gag order.325 
Gag orders on trial participants are often analyzed as prior restraints—
and thus subject to the heavy presumption of unconstitutionality—even 
when the challenger is a news organization that is not directly prevented 
from speaking.326  This was the approach taken by the court in the Kent 
State shooting case,327 and by subsequent courts following the Sixth 
Circuit’s lead.328  When a gag order is regarded as a prior restraint on 
publishing, it will be presumed unconstitutional unless there is a “clear 
showing” that the restriction is necessary to prevent a “serious and 
imminent threat” to a fair trial.329 
Some reviewing courts, however, distinguish between a direct and 
indirect restraint on the ability to disseminate news, finding that a gag on 
trial participants deprives journalists of no constitutionally protected right 
because there is no constitutional entitlement to interview any particular 
source.330  Those courts consequently relax their scrutiny when gag orders 
are challenged by media intervenors rather than by trial participants 
themselves.331  This line of reasoning has been influenced by the Supreme 
Court’s observation in Nebraska Press that orders limiting what lawyers 
and witnesses may say to anyone outside of the proceedings are “measures 
short of prior restraints on publication” and therefore more constitutionally 
tolerable than a direct restraint.332 
                                                          
 325. Sheryl A. Bjork, Comment, Indirect Gag Orders and the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 44 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 165, 187 (1989) (noting that prosecutors and defendants are reluctant to oppose gag 
orders for fear of prejudicing the presiding judge against them). 
 326. See Rene L. Todd, Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response to 
Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (1990) 
(stating that most courts examine participant-directed gag orders using “traditional prior restraint 
analysis”); see also Conn. Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D. Conn. 1987) (“An order 
prohibiting extrajudicial comments by counsel constitutes a prior restraint on the right to gather news 
and derivatively on publication.”) (citing Journal Publ’g Co., 801 F.2d at 1236). 
 327. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238–39 (6th Cir. 1975).  
 328. See, e.g., People v. Sledge, 879 N.W.2d 884, 892–93 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (following CBS, 
Inc., and declaring judicial gag order to be an unconstitutional prior restraint on media intervenors). 
 329. United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 599–601 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 330. See, e.g., Radio & Television News Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 781 F.2d 
1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 331. See, e.g., id. (requiring only a reasonable justification for a judge’s gag order on participants 
in criminal trial).  
 332. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563–65 (1976).  See, e.g., State ex rel. The 
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Illustratively, the Second Circuit took this view in a 1988 case 
challenging a trial judge’s order gagging all of the participants in a federal 
racketeering trial in which a former New York congressman was among 
the high-profile defendants.333  In that case, In re Application of Dow Jones 
& Co., the court found that news organizations had standing to challenge 
the order because they were the prospective recipients of speech, but 
declined to characterize the order as a “prior restraint” on the media 
plaintiffs.334  “[W]e conclude that there is a fundamental difference between 
a gag order challenged by the individual gagged and one challenged by a third 
party; an order objected to by the former is properly characterized as a 
prior restraint, one opposed solely by the latter is not,” the judges wrote.335  
The court looked to the relative perils faced by the actors in the case, 
noting that only the speakers, not the journalists, risked contempt sanctions 
if the court’s order was violated.336  Because the order did not qualify as a 
prior restraint, it was not treated as presumptively unconstitutional; rather, 
the court upheld its legality under a balancing-of-interests approach, 
finding that the proper standard is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood 
that pretrial publicity will prejudice a fair trial.”337 
By analogy, if restrictions on employees’ speech are viewed as 
directly injuring the news organizations that seek to interview them, the 
level of scrutiny afforded to the prohibition will be more rigorous and the 
prohibition will be less likely to survive if the challenge is brought by 
journalists.  In an instructive case, a federal district court in Louisiana took 
the position that a judicial gag on trial participants would be analyzed 
under the rigorous prior-restraint doctrine only if challenged by the party 
actually restrained from speaking, not by a news organization on which 
the restraint falls less directly.338 
                                                          
Missoulian v. Mont. Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Ct., 933 P.2d 829, 839 (Mont. 1997) (applying 
Nebraska Press and concluding: “While an order restraining the trial participants from communicating 
with the press may be a prior restraint upon the participants as communicators, it is not a prior restraint 
upon the press.”).  A well-reasoned critique for the Miami Law Review argues that the Sixth Circuit 
has the better argument, because the Supreme Court’s prior-restraint jurisprudence is best understood 
as protecting not just speakers but speech, and a judicially-imposed gag order on speaking to the media 
is a de facto prohibition on the dissemination of information by journalists.  Bjork, supra note 325, at 
183–85. 
 333. In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 604–05 (2d Cir. 1988).   
 334. Id. at 607–09.  The court relied in part on the Ninth Circuit’s resolution in Radio & Television 
News Ass’n, 781 F.2d at 1446 (holding that a restraining order not directed at the press does not restrain 
press First Amendment rights). 
 335. In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d at 609. 
 336. Id. at 608. 
 337. Id. at 610 (quotation marks omitted). 
 338. See United States v. Davis, 902 F. Supp. 98, 102 (E.D. La. 1995) (“The First Amendment 
interests of trial participants in their own speech are simply not doctrinally coextensive with the 
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The diminished level of First Amendment protection that applies to 
public employees does not extend to journalists.  When the government 
restrains journalists from publishing, the government cannot fall back on 
the “efficiency” justifications that legitimize restricting employee speech.  
Consequently, if a restriction on public employee speech is seen as directly 
restraining journalistic speech, it should be presumed unconstitutional 
absent the most compelling of justifications. 
Conversely, if the gag order is seen as an injury only to the public 
employee, the journalist may be reduced to piggybacking on the 
employee’s more limited set of rights.  In the somewhat analogous setting 
of access to interviews with prison inmates, the Supreme Court held in 
Pell v. Procunier that the California prison system’s policy of limiting 
prisoners’ ability to grant interviews was justified by reasonable safety 
concerns and did not violate the rights of either inmates or the journalists 
who sought to interview them.339  The Court explained: 
It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of 
information not available to members of the general public, that he is 
entitled to some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of such 
sources . . . and that government cannot restrain the publication of news 
emanating from such sources . . . .  It is quite another thing to suggest 
that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to 
make available to journalists sources of information not available to 
members of the public generally.  That proposition finds no support in 
the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court.340 
The takeaway from Pell is that journalists may have only the benefit 
of the First Amendment protection afforded to their sources (which, in 
Pell, turned out to be none).341  In the case of restrictions on interviews 
with public employees, a court analogizing to Pell might afford journalists 
only the quantum of rights that their would-be sources would enjoy under 
Garcetti.  As with the inmates in Pell, journalists do not have a 
constitutionally protected right to insist on interviewing any particular 
government employee.342 
                                                          
interests of news agencies in that speech.”).  
 339. 417 U.S. 817, 819–20, 831–35 (1974). 
 340. Id. at 834–35 (citations omitted). 
 341. Id. at 834. 
 342. The Ninth Circuit, upholding a judicially imposed gag on trial participants in Radio & 
Television News Association, made the same observation that journalists do not have a First 
Amendment right to insist on access to interview particular attorneys of their choosing.  See Radio & 
Television News Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 781 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“[T]he media’s collateral interest in interviewing trial participants is outside the scope of protection 
offered by the first amendment . . . .  The media’s desire to obtain access to certain sources of 
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While somewhat logically analogous, the Pell prison setting is 
distinguishable.  The Pell Court emphasized that journalists had effective 
alternative means of keeping watch on prison conditions other than by 
arranging interviews, including by visiting the prisons and questioning any 
inmates they encountered.343  The policy upheld in Pell was thus a more 
limited gag order than the ones typically in force in the public workplace.  
Moreover, the overriding safety considerations that were found to justify 
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms in Pell are not nearly so 
pronounced outside of prisons and jails. 
These two analogous bodies of law—the first involving trial 
participants and the second involving prison inmates—point in somewhat 
different directions, leaving uncertainty about the standard that applies if 
a media plaintiff challenges a gag order on public employees.  
Nevertheless, in neither context have journalists failed to surmount the 
threshold standing requirements to initiate a case. 
Strong practical considerations counsel in favor of recognizing standing 
for journalists to challenge employer policies that restrain employees from 
speaking to the media, whether in their own right or as stand-ins for the 
employees themselves.  The Supreme Court has recognized that the case for 
third-party standing is especially compelling when the fear of harm from 
adverse publicity deters the most directly injured party from suing.344  This 
would apply most especially in the case of employees who—but-for the 
threat of punishment if discovered by their employers—would supply 
information to journalists anonymously as whistleblowers.  Employees are 
highly unlikely to be so motivated to speak to the media as to invest money 
and risk workplace relationships—exposing themselves as would-be 
whistleblowers—to initiate First Amendment litigation adversarial to their 
own employers.  This “motivation” consideration has been recognized as 
a justification for conferring standing on news organizations in the context 
of gags on trial participants.345  Moreover, an employee may lose incentive 
to pursue a case in midstream, either because the matter on which the 
                                                          
information, that otherwise might be available, is not a sufficient interest to establish an infringement 
of freedom of the press in this case.” (citation omitted)). 
 343. Pell, 417 U.S. at 830. 
 344. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681–84, 684 n.4 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976)) (recognizing that minors would not come 
forward to challenge a law forbidding them from purchasing contraceptives, because doing so would 
expose their private sexual practices, thus making a contraceptive vendor a suitable stand-in plaintiff).  
 345. Todd, supra note 326, at 1192 (“Witnesses, for example, may have little at stake in the 
primary litigation at issue, and thus may have little motivation to spend time and effort challenging a 
restraint on their speech regarding that litigation.  Likewise, litigants, who bear the cost of the primary 
litigation, may be unable to spare the resources necessary to challenge participant-directed gag 
orders.”). 
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employee wished to be heard becomes stale, or because the employee 
changes jobs.  A news organization is likely to confront the same gag 
policy over and over again, while an employee might encounter it only 
once in a career. 
For all of these reasons, news organizations are suitable plaintiffs 
well-incentivized to effectively litigate the issues involved in workplace 
gag orders.346  Whether the impact of employer gag policies is viewed as 
a prior restraint on journalists’ ability to publish, or whether the First 
Amendment interest is located elsewhere—perhaps in the right to receive 
information,347 or derivatively, in the constitutional interests of the 
speaker—news organizations should have no difficulty establishing that 
they satisfy the threshold constitutional and prudential standing 
requirements to pursue a challenge.  Even a membership organization that 
represents the interest of the news media, such as the Society of 
Professional Journalists, may have standing to initiate litigation 
challenging workplace gag policies.348 
The policy considerations that favor a skeptical view of judicially 
imposed gag orders apply even more forcefully in the employment setting.  
While a trial judge rarely will have a self-serving reason for silencing trial 
participants—the judge’s rationale is almost always to guard against 
prejudicial pretrial publicity—an agency restraining its employees from 
speaking to the media has obvious, self-interested motives.  And while the 
right to a fair trial is an interest of constitutional dimension (at least in the 
criminal setting) so that there are constitutional imperatives on both sides 
of the equation, no such offsetting constitutional concern militates in favor 
of agencies silencing their employees.  For all of these reasons, restraints 
on public-employee speech should receive review at least as rigorous as 
                                                          
 346. When permitting a party to litigate the injuries of others, federal courts inquire as a threshold 
matter whether the litigant’s interest is sufficiently concrete to provide motivation to litigate the case.  
See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114 (“The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore should prefer 
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 347. While not as well-defined as the right to publish information, the right to receive information 
has been acknowledged in multiple Supreme Court decisions spanning the past half-century.  See 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 568 (1969) (recognizing “right to receive information and 
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 348. The Utah Supreme Court recognized SPJ as a proper party to bring a First Amendment-based 
challenge to the closure of a judicial hearing on the grounds that the SPJ’s individual journalist 
members would themselves have standing and that the relief sought—opening the hearing—did not 
require the participation of the members as individuals.  Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Bullock, 743 
P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987).  
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that regularly applied to invalidate overbroad trial-court gag orders.349 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
America is facing a crisis in the accessibility of civically essential 
information.  The number of working professional journalists is dwindling 
to lows unprecedented in modern history, and many small communities 
are no longer served by a local newspaper at all.350  In an apocalyptic 
column for the Washington Post, acclaimed journalists Douglas 
McLennan and Jack Miles gave voice to the worst fears of those who rely 
on the fraying information safety net that traditional news organizations 
provide: “[O]nce newspapers stop reporting any facts at all, nothing will 
stop autonomous spin—spin that generates its own facts, such as the ‘fact’ 
that Barack Obama is a foreign-born closet Muslim—from taking over 
entirely.  The loyal opposition will no longer be there to research, fact-
check, report and oppose.”351 
At the same time that newsrooms have been hollowed out by layoffs, 
or closed or merged out of existence entirely, government investment in 
pushing out its own message through public-relations professionals has 
never been greater.  The U.S. government is conservatively estimated to 
spend $1.5 billion a year on public relations, according to the Government 
Accountability Office.352  States and their subsidiary agencies are similarly 
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outside of the judicial setting is that there is a recognized First Amendment right for journalists to 
attend trials and all other critical stages of judicial proceedings.  Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980).  There is no equivalent First Amendment right of access to information 
about the workings of executive or legislative entities.  See McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 232, 
237 (2013) (declining to recognize a right of constitutional dimension entitling requesters to obtain 
public records from state executive-branch agencies).  
 350. See Erin Keane, The U.S. Newspaper Crisis is Growing: More Than 1 in 5 Local Papers Have 
Closed Since 2004, SALON (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:20 PM), https://www.salon.com/2018/10/16/the-u-s-
newspaper-crisis-is-growing-more-than-1-in-5-local-papers-have-closed-since-2004/ [https://perma.cc/Y5 
MR-7KNQ] (documenting the growing phenomenon of “news deserts” resulting from the shutdown of some 
1,800 newspapers since 2004); Sasha Lekach, Fewer Than Half of Newspaper Jobs from 15 Years Ago Still 
Exist, MASHABLE (Apr. 4, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/04/04/newspaper-publishers-jobs-decline-
bls/#XlGBk_w84sq8 [https://perma.cc/FA4U-QVCW] (quoting Bureau of Labor Statistics report that 
shows, over the past fifteen years, more than half the jobs in the American news industry have disappeared); 
Dermot Murphy, When Local Papers Close, Costs Rise for Local Governments, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/public-finance-local-news.php  [https://perma.cc 
/6QKD-5AAZ] (reporting that “local newspaper circulation numbers dropped by roughly [thirty] percent” 
during the preceding fifteen years, and citing academic studies suggesting that “a lack of local media 
coverage is associated with less informed voters, lower voter turnouts, and less engaged local politicians”). 
 351. Douglas McLennan & Jack Miles, A Once Unimaginable Scenario: No More Newspapers, WASH. 
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 352. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-711, PUBLIC RELATIONS SPENDING: 
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staffing up their “storytelling” capability, to put their version of what the 
government is doing directly before audiences, bypassing traditional 
journalistic gatekeepers who might fact-check their accounts.353 
As the diverging trajectories of these two trend lines makes clear, it is 
harder than ever for news organizations to get past the “spin” offered by 
public-relations professionals to inform the public about what is really 
going on inside government agencies—and there are more professional 
operatives than ever whose job is to shape public opinion to create a 
favorable impression of the agency.354  In such a climate, journalists need 
ready access to the insiders who can provide a candid, unfiltered look at 
how government is working and where it is falling short.  As a longtime 
Washington, D.C., reporter told the Poynter Institute’s journalism blog: “I 
don’t think there is any question about it.  When you talk with people who 
are under the oversight of a PIO, you get a massively different story than 
when you are free to talk to a source without that supervision.”355  Gagging 
employees from speaking to the media manifestly disserves the public’s 
interest in honest, accountable government.  As one commentator wrote in 
assessing the impact of the Garcetti ruling on the job security of 
journalists’ sources: “If government employees can be disciplined without 
First Amendment limits for job-related speech, government employers 
now have another tool to discourage, intimidate and punish whistleblowers 
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and leakers. . . .”356  Concurring in a Fourth Circuit decision that protected 
the speech of a former police commander––Michael Andrew, terminated 
for leaking an internal memo to a newspaper reporter––Judge Harvie 
Wilkinson emphasized the special importance of protecting public 
employees’ ability to furnish information to today’s diminished press 
corps: 
To throw out this citizen who took his concerns to the press on a motion 
to dismiss would have profound adverse effects on accountability in 
government.  And those effects would be felt at a particularly parlous 
time.  It is well known that the advent of the Internet and the economic 
downturn have caused traditional news organizations throughout the 
country to lose circulation and advertising revenue to an unforeseen 
extent . . . .  [I]n these most difficult of times, not only investigative 
coverage, but substantive reports on matters of critical public policy are 
increasingly shortchanged.  So, for many reasons and on many fronts, 
intense scrutiny of the inner workings of massive public bureaucracies 
charged with major public responsibilities is in deep trouble . . . . 
[T]he First Amendment should never countenance the gamble that 
informed scrutiny of the workings of government will be left to wither 
on the vine.  That scrutiny is impossible without some assistance from 
inside sources such as Michael Andrew.  Indeed, it may be more 
important than ever that such sources carry the story to the reporter, 
because there are, sad to say, fewer shoeleather journalists to ferret the 
story out.357 
In a December 2016 white paper issued by the American Association 
of University Professors, a coalition of free-expression organizations 
decried worsening impediments imposed by campus media-relations 
officials that inhibit campus journalists from gaining access to 
newsmakers: 
No postsecondary institution should require its faculty or staff to clear 
interactions with the student media through an institutional public-
relations office, nor should campus public-relations offices obstruct 
student journalists from gaining direct access to those in positions of 
official authority.  The community is entitled to hear directly from 
campus officials about how they perform their jobs and wield their 
authority—through face-to-face interaction with journalists, not simply 
prepared statements.358 
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What is lost when journalists are unable to have open and unfiltered 
communications with government employees?  One consequence is that 
reporters become more dependent on unnamed sources, as employees seek 
the sanctum of anonymity to protect against supervisory retaliation.  
Heavily using anonymous sources has been shown to make news reports 
less believable, thus taking a toll on the public’s already-diminished faith 
in the trustworthiness of news coverage.359 
Where the right to speak about contemporary issues of the day is at 
stake, delay is itself an injury.360  As one federal judge observed in 
invalidating a fire department’s policy requiring pre-approval from the fire 
chief of any statement meant for publication: “Even if the chief decided to 
approve every request for constitutionally-protected speech, plaintiffs 
would have to wait hours or even days for the permission.  Even a 
temporary restraint on expression may constitute irreparable injury.”361  As 
a practical matter, delay is often tantamount to a denial.  If a journalist 
working on a time-sensitive story asks for a comment and is told, “I can’t 
talk without going through an approval process,” there is every chance the 
journalist will simply move on, and the employee’s opportunity to address 
the issue will be lost. 
Because Garcetti has proven so confusingly malleable, it is important 
to maintain the judicially recognized distinction between challenges to 
individual disciplinary decisions over the content of particular work-
related speech (Garcetti and Pickering) versus facial challenges to 
categorical prohibitions on work-related speech (NTEU).  Otherwise, the 
Garcetti standard can easily be manipulated by employers to transform all 
interactions with the news media into work assignments.  That is to say, if 
employers are allowed to filter all news media inquiries through the 
supervisor of public relations, and that supervisor then designates a 
particular agency employee to respond to the journalist, then every 
interview can always be characterized as an official work assignment.362 
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Forbidding employees from discussing their work with the news 
media invariably will fail the test of overbreadth, because a categorical 
prohibition cannot be shown to be necessary to advance the government’s 
justifications.363  The rationales commonly offered to legitimize 
restraining employee speech include avoiding public confusion about the 
agency’s work, and promoting a favorable public impression of the 
agency.364  For instance, a state university in New York directs its 
employees to funnel all media requests to the university’s marketing 
department, explaining: “Our goal is to speak with one voice as an 
institution, with the hope of generating positive news coverage of the New 
Paltz campus community.”365  But even if “positive news coverage” were 
recognized as a legitimate objective justifying the use of governmental 
authority to constrain speech, a total blackout on interviews is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired end.  In many instances, the 
prohibition will silence entirely harmless speech that is beyond the 
government’s legitimate authority to restrict.  The employee might issue 
an express disclaimer that she is sharing only her unofficial personal 
opinion.  The employee might address an issue so far afield of her job 
duties (for instance, the lack of adequate mass-transit options for her 
commute to work) that it will be obvious she is not speaking on behalf of 
the agency.  The news organization might not even identify the employee 
by her workplace affiliation at all.  Or the employee might say something 
complimentary that would actually enhance the public’s confidence in the 
agency. 
Agency interviewing policies are not narrowly tailored because they 
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treat all conversations with employees of all kinds equally, failing to 
account for qualitative differences in the public’s need to receive 
information; for instance, there is no recognition of the public’s heightened 
interest in being informed about such life-and-death functions of 
government as how police use their arrest authority.366  Additionally, few 
agency policies distinguish between on-duty and off-duty speech, 
conveying the impression that the employer claims authority over speech 
on personal time equivalent to that over speech at work during the 
workday.367  Nor are workplace policies tailored—as judicial gag orders 
commonly are—by duration, such as the length of a trial; an employee 
who is restricted from talking about a sensitive ongoing matter of agency 
business is still restricted from talking about it five years later when the 
sensitivity has passed.368  As shown by the relative success that employers 
have experienced in defending disciplinary actions for workplace speech 
under the rules of Connick and Garcetti, an agency has recourse to the less 
speech-restrictive alternative of punishing particular acts of speech after-
the-fact if they prove disloyal or disruptive.369  For all of these reasons, the 
gag policies commonly in force across all levels of government are 
insufficiently well-tailored to survive an overbreadth challenge. 
Regardless of their questionable legality, employee gag policies are 
not just ubiquitous but unapologetically ubiquitous, their proponents 
seemingly unaware that a complete proscription against discussing 
government matters might implicate an employee’s legally protected 
                                                          
 366. Several federal courts have recognized, in the context of First Amendment claims involving 
the videotaping of police conducting official business in public spaces, that the public has an especially 
keen interest in keeping watch over the performance of critical public-safety duties.  See, e.g., Glik v. 
Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that the need to protect the public’s ability to gather 
information about government is “particularly true of law enforcement officials, who are granted 
substantial discretion that may be misused to deprive individuals of their liberties”); Fields v. City of 
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359–60 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Glik and deciding that the right to record 
police activity “falls squarely within the First Amendment right of access to information,” noting that 
videos of police doing their jobs may help expose official misconduct, or conversely, exonerate the 
wrongfully accused). 
 367. Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea has proposed a two-tiered standard under which off-hours 
speech is recognized as more highly protected.  See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of 
Off-Duty Government Employees, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2117, 2164–65 (2010) (asserting that off-duty 
speech should be punishable only if it reveals unfitness to perform official duties or is reasonably 
interpreted as an official agency statement by virtue of the speaker’s high-ranking position). 
 368. See, e.g., Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236–37 (10th Cir. 1986) (striking 
down judge’s order restraining media indefinitely from interviewing jurors after trial was concluded, 
because the order “contained no time or scope limitations and encompassed every possible juror 
interview situation”). 
 369. A judge’s ability to police speech that interferes with a fair trial through after-the-fact 
contempt sanctions was a consideration in the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a broad 
gag order on parties and attorneys.  See Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1339 (Ill. 1986). 
2019]  PUTTING THE ‘PUBLIC’ BACK INTO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 67 
rights.  In 2018, the newly elected mayor of McComb, Mississippi, 
emailed everyone in his administration, including the police chief, 
instructing them not to speak to the local newspaper.  When questioned, 
he flatly told the paper: “If you all want to know something, you see me.  
No city employee is supposed to talk to you.”370  In a report on the 
phenomenon of public-relations gatekeeping in government agencies, the 
nonprofit Poynter Institute quoted one handbook popular among Capitol 
Hill public-relations professionals, which instructs: 
It must be made clear to all staff that they should deal with the media 
only when authorized by the public relations team.  Loss of control over 
communications can be a disaster for an organization, leading to public 
controversy and loss of credibility . . . . 
Most organizations have policies against talking to reporters, but this is 
hard to enforce in a large organization.  If this occurs and the person 
responsible makes himself known, it’s best to clamp down as quickly as 
possible.371 
The notion that employees must be restrained from saying anything to 
the public about their work because they might compromise the image of 
the government agency or undercut the message that the agency hopes to 
convey devalues the public’s interest in an unvarnished understanding of 
how government works.  Government is not a brand of breakfast cereal or 
laundry detergent.  As Professors Carolyn Carlson and David Cuillier 
wrote, in cautioning of the dangers of increasingly aggressive 
intermediation by public-affairs officers: 
Information critical of the government might be less likely to come to 
light, and citizens might be left in the dark and ill-prepared to make 
informed decisions at the polls.  Ultimately, the United States could 
experience a gradual shift toward reduced press freedom and increased 
government propaganda endured in other nations.372 
Agencies can enforce narrow restrictions on communications with the 
media tailored to the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti standards, including 
prohibiting employees from compromising confidential information or 
holding themselves out as official agency spokespeople without 
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authorization.373  If an individual speaks in an especially disruptive manner 
that undermines trust in the speaker’s ability to perform as a public servant, 
the First Amendment does not foreclose imposing sanctions.  That is all the 
authority that government should need to accomplish its legitimate objectives.  
Wholesale prohibitions on unapproved contact with journalists, or with the 
general public, have long been recognized as unconstitutional, and remain so 
even after Garcetti. 
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